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Although the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane generally prohibits the 
application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure in federal habeas review of 
state-court judgments, the Court’s 2008 decision in Danforth v. Minnesota frees state 
courts from Teague’s strictures.  Danforth explicitly permits state courts to fashion their 
own rules governing the retroactive application of new federal constitutional rules in 
postconviction proceedings, and leaves open the question whether lower federal courts 
are bound by Teague in postconviction review of federal criminal convictions. 
In this Article, I examine the doctrinal underpinnings of the Court’s retroactivity 
jurisprudence, and propose that state courts and the lower federal courts abandon the 
Supreme Court’s experiment with nonretroactivity.  Affording retroactive application to 
new constitutional rules in state and federal postconviction proceedings promotes fairness 
to litigants and uniformity in the development of federal constitutional criminal doctrine.  
Perhaps most importantly, a rule of retroactivity permits the lower state and federal courts 
to regain a role in the development of constitutional doctrine that had previously been 
constricted, first by Teague and then by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act. 
My examination of the Danforth opinion leads me to believe that the foundations upon 
which Teague was built are now crumbling.  Danforth marks a shift in the Court’s 
conception of the function of habeas corpus which portends well for the reinvigoration of 
a constitutional dialogue among the lower courts and an increased role in constitutional 
development for the lower federal courts.
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Christopher N. Lasch1 
Beginning in 1965, the Supreme Court’s decisions on the retroactive application of new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure have presented a “confused and confusing”2 
jurisprudence. The Court’s recent decision in Danforth v. Minnesota,3 however, 
represents a significant and promising break with the past.  Danforth makes clear the 
Court’s retroactivity rules are binding only on federal courts considering state prisoners’ 
habeas corpus petitions.  State postconviction courts are explicitly declared free to 
disregard the Court’s jurisprudence.  Further, Danforth leaves open the possibility that 
federal courts considering the postconviction claims of federal prisoners may be similarly 
unbound.4   
After providing a brief overview of the processes of postconviction review, this Article 
examines the Danforth decision and its antecedents,5 and proposes that among the 
numerous possible retroactivity rules lower courts may adopt after Danforth, a rule of 
retroactivity should be preferred.  There are several reasons why lower courts – both 
state6 and federal7 – should adopt a rule of retroactive application of new constitutional 
rules of criminal procedure in postconviction cases. 
First, a rule of general retroactivity avoids the unfairness inevitably attendant to 
nonretroactive application of judicial decisions, ensuring that similarly situated litigants 
are treated equally. 
                                                        1 Associate Research Scholar in Law and Clinical Lecturer, Yale Law School. B.A., 
Columbia College; J.D., Yale.  I am deeply indebted to the following scholars who 
reviewed this article and provided critical comments that assisted me greatly: Giovanna 
Shay, Eric M. Freedman, David R. Dow, Randy A. Hertz, Kermit Roosevelt III, Adam N. 
Steinman, Dan M. Kahan, Kate Stith, Scott J. Shapiro, Tracey L. Meares, J.L. Pottenger, 
Jr., Dennis E. Curtis, Brett Dignam, Robert A. Solomon, Michael J. Wishnie, and Camille 
Carey.  I would also like to thank Anand Balakrishnan for his excellent research 
assistance and comments.  Finally, I am indebted to my mentors and fellow scholars in 
Yale Law School’s Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, who have provided 
support to me in ways too numerous to mention. Despite the valuable assistance of 
others, problems may persist and those, of course, should be attributed solely to me. 
2 Danforth, __ U.S. __, __, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008). 
3 __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008). 
4 Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1034 n.4. 
5 Sections I and II, infra. 
6 Section III, infra. 
7 Section IV, infra. 
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Second, a rule of general retroactivity will allow the lower courts – state and federal – to 
continue to participate in important doctrinal development.  The development of 
constitutional criminal doctrine has historically depended on lower courts’ ability to 
expound on the meaning of constitutional provisions, but has been hindered by the 
Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence and legislation limiting federal habeas review of state-
court judgments.  A rule of retroactivity will preserve a role for the lower courts in 
doctrinal development.  
Third, a general rule of retroactivity promotes uniformity in the application of 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure, whereas adoption of retroactivity rules which 
look to the nature of the constitutional rule at issue (as the Supreme Court’s retroactivity 
rules have) will lead to disuniformity which threatens the supremacy of federal law.  
In reaching these conclusions, I take into account the nature and function of state and 
federal postconviction proceedings, and particularly the ways in which they differ from 
the nature and function of federal habeas review of state-court judgments.  I also consider 
whether interests in the finality of criminal convictions outweigh the benefits to be served 
by a retroactivity regime, and conclude they do not. 
After evaluating the impact of Danforth on the lower courts in postconviction 
proceedings both state and federal, I turn to a brief examination of how Danforth may 
portend change for the future of the Court’s retroactivity doctrine in federal habeas 
corpus proceedings reviewing state-court judgments.8  I conclude that Danforth offers 
great hope for a return to a more constructive model of state-federal court “dialogue” on 
constitutional rules, replacing the paternalistic model of habeas review which held the 
threat of habeas relief as a punishment to be delivered to state courts who failed to “toe 
the constitutional line” set by the federal courts.  Additionally it appears the lower federal 
courts may, on the logic of the Danforth decision, move away from use of the 
retroactivity inquiry as a threshold question, which will allow lower federal courts to 
reintroduce themselves to the constitutional dialogue in federal habeas proceedings. 
 
PROLOGUE:  POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURES 
AS THEY EXIST TODAY  
To better understand the issues surrounding retroactivity in state and federal 
postconviction proceedings, it is critical to keep in mind the structure and functions of 
those proceedings as they exist today. 
The typical lifespan of a criminal case originating in state court can be divided into 
eleven stages: (1) trial; (2) direct appeal as of right,9 usually to an intermediate-level                                                         
8 Section V, infra. 
9 Although the United States Constitution does not require the state courts to provide an 
appeal as of right, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983), forty-seven states 
provide for appeal as of right and the other three have procedures “tantamount to an 
appeal as of right.” Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal 
Appeal, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 503, 513-14 (1992) (citations omitted). 
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appellate court10; (3) discretionary appeal within the state-court system, usually to the 
state’s highest court; (4) petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court; 
(5) petition for postconviction review (sometimes called “state habeas corpus”11), usually 
entertained by a trial-level state court; (6) direct appeal from the denial of postconviction 
relief, often as a matter of right, and usually to an intermediate-level appellate court12; (7) 
discretionary appeal within the state-court system, usually to the state’s highest court; (8) 
petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court13; (9) petition for writ of 
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“federal habeas corpus”), in United States 
District Court; (10) appeal to the United States Court of Appeals;14 and (11) petition for 
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.   
The first four stages of a state criminal case’s typical lifespan are the “direct review 
track,” the next four are the “state postconviction track,” and the final three stages are the 
“federal habeas corpus track.”  All of this is depicted in Figure 1 below. 
                                                        
10 In capital cases it is common for the direct appeal as of right to be taken directly to the 
state’s highest court, in which case stage 3 is omitted.  See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. VI, § 11; 
720 Ill. Compiled Stat. Ann. Act 5 § 9-1(i); Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.012(1). 
11 E.g. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-466. 
12 Once again, in capital cases it is common for the direct appeal from the denial of 
postconviction relief to be taken directly to the state’s highest court, in which case stage 7 
is omitted. E.g. Commonwealth v. Holland, 556 Pa. 175, 176 n.1, 727 A.2d 563, 564 n.1 
(1999); Commonwealth v. Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73, 84 (Ky. 2002) (state supreme court 
exercises direct appellate jurisdiction in cases “directly affecting the imposition of the 
death penalty … as a matter of policy”). 
13 In Lawrence v. Florida, 594 U.S. 327, 127 S.Ct. 1079 (2007), the Court held the one-
year statute of limitations for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district 
court is not tolled during the pendency of a petition for writ of certiorari following state 
postconviction proceedings.  It is likely, given this holding, combined with the rarity of a 
certiorari grant at this stage, see Lawrence, 127 S.Ct. at 1084, that many litigants will 
choose to forego filing a certiorari petition. 
14 Appeal from the denial of federal habeas corpus relief is limited to those issues as to 
which the petitioner is successful in obtaining a “certificate of appealability” from the 
district or circuit courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. 
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By contrast, the typical lifespan of a criminal case originating in federal court only 
consists of six stages: (1) trial; (2) direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals; (3) 
certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court; (4) a motion to set aside, vacate, or 
correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in the United States District Court;15 (5) 
direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals;16 and (6) certiorari review by the 
United States Supreme Court. The first three stages are the “direct review track,” and the 
















Figure 2.  Typical Lifespan of a Federal Criminal Case.                                                         
15 Federal postconviction proceedings are often referred to as “habeas corpus” 
proceedings, but the use of this terminology leads to confusion.  To differentiate actions 
involving federal prisoners from those involving state prisoners, I will use “federal 
postconviction” to refer to proceedings in which a federal prisoner seeks postconviction 
relief, and “federal habeas corpus” to refer to proceedings in which a state prisoner 
challenges the constitutionality of his or her confinement. 
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In practice, significant deviations from the typical can occur, in the form of interlocutory 
appeals, ancillary litigation in the form of writs of prohibition or mandamus, petitions for 
rehearing, successive postconviction petitions, successive federal habeas corpus petitions, 
and the like. Yet, for purposes of a general discussion about how the state and federal 
postconviction review processes function, and how they ought to function, these typical 
lifespans will suffice.  
 
The critical difference between state and federal criminal cases lies in the existence of 
extra tiers of review of state cases.  As can be seen from Figure 1, state criminal cases are 
subject to federal court review in two ways – through certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court from state-court judgments,17 and through federal habeas corpus review.  
This inter-system review, of course, is occasioned by the federal system and the 
supremacy of federal law.  Federal criminal cases are never subjected to inter-system 
review.   
I. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT’S CRIMINAL 
RETROACTIVITY JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE DANFORTH  
A. Brown v. Allen and the expansion of federal habeas review  
Inter-system review is a driving force behind the jurisprudence and literature on 
retroactivity.  Indeed, the history of the Court’s criminal retroactivity jurisprudence18                                                         
17 Giovanna Shay and I have elsewhere described the growing importance of the Supreme 
Court’s certiorari review of state-court judgments after passage of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch 
[hereinafter Shay & Lasch], Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased 
Importance under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari  from Judgments of State Courts, 50 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211 (2008).  Much of what was said in that article is relevant here, 
and I am indebted to Professor Shay in this regard. 
18 This history has been recounted in fine detail by numerous scholars. See, e.g., John 
Blume, The Changing Face of Retroactivity, 58 UMKC L. Rev. 581, 584-91 (1990); See 
RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, § 25.2 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter Hertz & Liebman]; David R. Dow, Teague 
and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 
Hastings Const. L. Q. 23, 33-38 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New 
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1738-49 
(1991) [hereinafter Fallon & Meltzer]; Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a 
Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 1075, 1081-
1103 (1999) [hereinafter Roosevelt (1999)]; Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity 
Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What the Supreme Court Learned from Paul 
Mishkin, and What it Might,” 95 California L. Rev. 1677, 1678-87 (2007) [hereinafter 
Roosevelt (2007)]; Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity 
Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, 25 Amer. J. of Crim. Law 203, 210-25 (1998). The history I provide draws on this 
excellent body of work, but is my own to the extent that it is selective and grossly 
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actually begins with a case that did not address retroactivity at all, but was instead 
concerned with the scope of inter-system review in criminal cases.  I am referring to the 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Allen.19   
Prior to Brown, the processes of inter-system review depicted in Figure 1 above were not 
fully effectuated.  Originally, federal habeas review of state-court judgments was 
technically limited to cases in which the state court lacked “jurisdiction.”20 In the first 
half of the twentieth century, this concept yielded considerably to the notion that habeas 
corpus was available to correct deprivations of due process of law.21  Where state courts 
provided adequate “corrective process,” relitigation of issues on habeas corpus was not 
permitted.22  
In Brown, the Court considered two cases wherein the habeas petitioners had fully 
litigated their federal constitutional claims in the state courts.  Instead of adverting to the 
“corrective process” of those states, however, the Supreme Court plunged headlong into 
resolution of the merits of the cases.  And the Court specifically noted the authority of the 
federal district courts to conduct evidentiary hearings in such cases, even where the facts 
had been determined after evidentiary proceedings in the state courts.23  In short, Brown 
v. Allen authorized federal courts to engage in complete relitigation of federal claims 
previously adjudicated in state-court criminal proceedings.24   
                                                                                                                                                                     
incomplete – I have attempted to offer enough for the reader to appreciate the general 
thrust of the Court’s jurisprudence and the relevant theories, to illuminate my own 
arguments set forth here.  There are many nuanced aspects to the cases and theories 
mentioned here which are dispensed with as unnecessary to the discussion.  All histories, 
of course, differ significantly in their assessment of the importance of the various factors 
believed to drive the Court. Indeed, the Court offers its own version of the history of its 
retroactivity jurisprudence in Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1036-38, which (as I point out 
below, see infra note 265, and accompanying text) engages in some revisionism. 
19 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
20 See Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1036. 
21 Id. & n.7. 
22 Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 335-36 (1915) (holding that factual determinations of 
Georgia Supreme Court were exercise of that court’s “corrective process” which “must 
be taken as setting forth the truth of the matter ….”). 
23 Brown, 344 U.S. at 463-64. 
24 See H.L.A. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 106 
(1959) (noting that Brown “manifestly broke new ground” by implying that “due process 
of law is not primarily concerned with the adequacy of the state’s corrective process … 
but relates essentially to the avoidance in the end of any underlying constitutional error 
….”); but see Eric M. Freedman, Brown v. Allen: The Habeas Corpus Revolution That 
Wasn’t, 51 Alabama L.R. 1541, 1617 (2000) (“Legally, Brown was an exceedingly minor 
event.”).  
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This prompted strong criticism from Professor Paul Bator, who in an influential 1963 
article 25 strongly questioned the need for such expansive inter-system review through 
federal habeas corpus.26  Bator argued the importance of resisting “the impulse … to 
make doubly, triply, even ultimately sure that the particular judgment is just, that the 
facts as found are ‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct.’”27  A major step in Bator’s 
argument was the rejection of even the possibility of being “sure” – and the replacement 
of the goal of confidence in a “true” outcome with the goal of confidence in the criminal 
adjudicatory process, the “set of arrangements and procedures which provide a reasoned 
and acceptable probability that justice will be done, that the facts found will be ‘true’ and 
the law applied ‘correct.’”28  Once the focus on objective truth is replaced by a focus on 
process, the question to be asked for each procedure under consideration for inclusion in 
the adjudicatory process is, simply, whether the benefits of the procedure (including its 
perceived truth-finding ability) outweigh the costs.  Seen in these terms, federal habeas 
corpus could, and Bator argued should, be addressed “not so much to the substantive 
question whether truth prevailed but to the institutional or functional one, whether the 
complex of arrangements and processes which previously determined the facts and 
applied the law validating detention was adequate to the task at hand?”29 
Turning to the question of federal habeas corpus review, Bator supported his objection to 
the relitigation on the merits of federal constitutional questions already decided on the 
merits by state courts in three ways – by positing the “parity” of state and federal judges 
                                                        
25 Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963). 
26 Bator did not question the need for United States Supreme Court review of state-court 
judgments via the writ of certiorari. See id. at 510 (noting that certiorari review satisfies 
“the need for uniform, authoritative pronouncements of federal law”); see also id. at 453 
(“[R]ecourse in our federal system to the Federal Supreme Court provides the state courts 
with authoritative and uniform pronouncements of federal law.”).  Bator also rejected the 
view (which he attributed to Professor Hart) that federal habeas should be expansive 
because the Supreme Court so often denies certiorari, and “a state prisoner ought to have 
an opportunity for a hearing on a federal constitutional claim in a federal constitutional 
court.” Id. at 507.  For Bator, the presumption that federal judges are more “correct” was, 
in fact, incorrect – Bator championed the notion that federal and state judges enjoy 
“parity” in their ability to address federal constitutional questions. Id. at 509-10.  
Additionally, viewing the lower courts on federal habeas as substitutes for the Supreme 
Court’s certiorari jurisdiction ignores the essential reason for that jurisdiction – “the need 
for uniform, authoritative pronouncements of federal law” – which cannot be achieved 
through habeas corpus. Id. at 510. 
27 Id. at 443. 
28 Id. at 448. 
29 Id. 
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in ability to adjudicate federal questions;30 by citing comity concerns;31 and, most 
importantly for this Article, by citing “finality” concerns. 
Finality, urged Bator, is essential for the “conservation of resources … not only simple 
economic resources, but all of the intellectual, moral, and political resources involved in 
the legal system.”32  Among such squandered resources are the “sense of responsibility” 
among state-court judges,33 the deterrent value of the criminal law,34 and the 
rehabilitative value of the criminal law.35 
Bator’s discussion of the finality concerns militating against extensive inter-system 
habeas review has since been canonized in Supreme Court jurisprudence.36  
The expansion of habeas corpus criticized by Professor Bator37 did not cease, however.  
In Fay v. Noia,38 the Court held that a prisoner who had failed to litigate his federal 
constitutional claims in the state courts might nonetheless do so on federal habeas review, 
provided the prisoner did not deliberately bypass the corrective processes of the state                                                         
30 See note 26, supra. For a different view, see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977) (deriding parity as a “dangerous myth” and a “mistaken 
assumption”). 
31 Bator, note 25, supra, at 503-06. 
32 Id. at 451. 
33 Bator’s view of the criminal adjudicatory system as process (and not truth-seeking) led 
him to the belief that each subsequent level of review must be justified by a purpose: 
“What seems so objectionable is second-guessing merely for the sake of second-guessing, 
in the service of the illusory notion that if we only try hard enough we will find the 
‘truth.’”  Id. Appeals, for example, would remain valuable for Bator – despite the 
potentially corrosive effect on the morale of a trial judge of feeling “that all of the shots 
will always be called by someone else” – because of their “functional and ethical 
purposes.”  But, for Bator, it would be wrong to allow “still further recourse where these 
purposes may no longer be relevant.” Id. 
34 Id. at 452. 
35 Id. 
36 E.g., Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1052-53 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing finality’s 
relationship to deterrence); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (discussing 
finality’s relationship to deterrence, retribution, and the subversion of responsibility of 
state-court judges) (quoting Bator, supra note 25, at 451); McCleskey v. Zant, 466 U.S. 
467, 491-92 (discussing finality’s relationship to deterrence) (quoting Bator, 76 Harv. L. 
Rev. at 452-53); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (“Without finality, the criminal law 
is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”) (citing, inter alia, Bator, supra note 25, at 
450-51); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1986) (discussing finality’s 
relationship to deterrence and rehabilitation) (citing Bator, supra note 25, at 452).   
37 Professor Freedman takes Bator to task for viewing Brown v. Allen as a “radical” step 
in expanding federal habeas corpus, and argues that Brown “was in no way 
revolutionary.” Freedman, supra note 24, at 1545-46. 
38 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
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courts.39  Writing for the Court at a later date, Justice Powell described Fay v. Noia as 
removing “[t]he final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of state criminal 
convictions in federal habeas corpus ….”40 
The expansion of the procedures of federal habeas corpus paralleled an expansion in the 
substantive bases for habeas relief.  As Justice Stevens summarized in Danforth: 
The serial incorporation of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights during the 1950’s 
and 1960’s … created more opportunity for claims that individuals were being 
convicted without due process and held in violation of the Constitution.  
Nevertheless, until 1965 the Court continued to construe every constitutional error, 
including newly announced ones, as entitling state prisoners to relief on federal 
habeas.41 
These two historical developments – the expansion of habeas corpus, and the wholesale 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states – set the stage for the Court to make 
a “serious mistake,”42 one which would set the Court on a “retroactivity odyssey”43 of 
which Danforth is merely the most recent chapter. 
B. The birth of nonretroactivity: Linkletter v. Walker 
and Professor Mishkin’s critique  
The final ingredient in the recipe for disaster was the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule.  In Mapp v. Ohio44 the Court had held the exclusionary rule, long applied to remedy 
Fourth Amendment violations in the federal courts,45 to be equally binding on state 
courts.  In Linkletter v. Walker,46 the Court was called upon to decide whether the Mapp 
rule would apply in federal habeas proceedings.  The prospect of upsetting “thousands”47 
of final state-court convictions in order to apply the exclusionary rule was too much.48  In 
order to “support a desirable result”49 -- preventing the feared major disruption                                                         
39 Id. at 438 (Charles Noia, the habeas petitioner, was entitled to merits determination of 
federal constitutional issues, where his failure to pursue those claims by appealing within 
the state system did not amount to a knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver of those 
corrective processes). 
40 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 (1976). 
41 128 S.Ct. at 1037. 
42 Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18, at 1684. 
43 Id. 
44 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
45 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
46 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
47 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. 
48 In the words of Professor Roosevelt, “[t]he Linkletter result was almost inevitable.” 
Roosevelt (1999), supra note 18, at 1091. 
49 Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of 
Time and Law,” 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 57-58 (1965). 
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application of the Mapp rule to habeas petitioners would entail -- the Court cut a 
“Faustian bargain,”50 abandoning centuries of adherence to a strict rule of retroactivity.51 
The bargain was struck – the Court in Linkletter insisted on a broad authority to 
determine the retroactivity or prospectivity of judicial rulings,52 and fashioned a test for 
making that determination for cases on federal habeas.  The test, of course, ensured that 
Mapp would not apply retroactively, by including as relevant considerations the purpose 
of the rule (the exclusionary rule’s purpose being to deter Fourth Amendment violations, 
the Court found, describing the rule as “an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no 
bearing on guilt”53); the extent to which the parties had relied on the “old” rule (states had 
relied on the Court’s pre-Mapp precedent declining to apply the exclusionary rule to the 
states54); and finally the effect retroactive application would have on the administration of 
justice (retrospective application of the exclusionary rule “would tax the administration 
of justice to the utmost”55). 
The criticism of Linkletter came swiftly and has persisted to date.  Professor Paul 
Mishkin’s immediate assault56 on Linkletter has undoubtedly been the most influential 
critique.  In many ways it was a blueprint for the Danforth decision. 
Mishkin struck at the very foundation of the Linkletter decision – the Court’s dramatic 
rejection of the long-accepted “declaratory” theory of judging in favor of a “creative” 
theory of judging.  The declaratory model comes from Blackstone, who “stated the rule 
that the duty of the court was not to ‘pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound 
the old one.’”57 Thus, “[t]he judge rather than being the creator of the law was but its 
discoverer.”58   
The Linkletter Court, however, heralded the ascendancy of the alternative approach of 
John Austin, who “maintained that Blackstone could not grasp the idea that judges do in 
fact ‘make’ law, because of Blackstone's adherence to ‘the childish fiction employed by                                                         
50 Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18, at 1683. 
51 See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years”). 
52 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 & n.3 (rejecting criticism that pure prospectivity violates 
Article III); id. at 629 (“[We believe that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires 
retrospective effect.”). 
53 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636, 637-38. 
54 Id. at 637.  
55 Id. at 637. 
56 Supra note 49. 
57 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622-23 (quoting 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 69 (15th ed. 
1809)).  Justice Clark was also careful to note that “[w]hile Blackstone is always cited as 
the foremost exponent of the declaratory theory, a very similar view was stated by Sir 
Matthew Hale in his History of the Common Law which was published 13 years before 
the birth of Blackstone.” Id. at 623 & n.7 (citing Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law 
206 (1st ed. 1909)). 
58 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623. 
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our judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, but is a miraculous 
something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and merely declared from 
time to time by judges.’”59  Citing with approval those who decried the Blackstonian 
view as “out of tune with actuality,”60 the Linkletter Court emerged from the 
Blackstonian “shadow”61 over its jurisprudence and declared adherence to Austin’s view 
that “judges do in fact do something more than discover law; they make it interstitially by 
filling in with judicial interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or 
common-law terms that alone are but the empty crevices of the law.”62 
Professor Mishkin, while accepting that “the Blackstonian conception is not entirely 
valid,”63 lamented Linkletter’s move toward Austin and political realism: 
Despite (and perhaps also because of) its shortcomings as a description of reality, the 
“declaratory theory” expresses a symbolic concept of the judicial process on which 
much of courts' prestige and power depend. …[T]his symbolic view of courts is a 
major factor in securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial decisions. If the view 
be in part myth, it is a myth by which we live and which can be sacrificed only at 
substantial cost; consider, for example, the loss involved if judges could not appeal to 
the idea that it is “the law” or “the Constitution” – and not they personally – who 
command a given result.64 
“Prospective limitation of judicial decisions,” wrote Mishkin, “wars with this symbol.”65 
Mishkin also noted an “institutional consideration” raised by prospectivity – its impact on 
the development of constitutional law.  The prospect of prospectivity, Mishkin believed, 
might reduce or eliminate the incentives of counsel to argue for change in the law.66  
Indeed, Mishkin valued such change even more highly than he did the symbolism of the 
declaratory view: “Law must in fact change, and its stultification would be too high a 
price to pay for maintenance of the symbolism.”67   
Relegating the “declaratory” view to a symbolic rather than literal one allowed Mishkin 
to recognize that law does in fact change, whether one lives in a Blackstonian or an 
Austinian world.  What would differ between the two worlds, posited Mishkin, would be 
the pace of change.  While the proponents of an Austinian world of pure prospectivity 
                                                        
59 Charles Leonard Scalise, Comment: A Clear Break from the Clear Break Exception of 
Retroactivity Analysis: Griffith v. Kentucky, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 473, 477 & n.26 (1988) 
(citing J. AUSTIN, 2 JURISPRUDENCE 634 (1885)). 
60 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 623-24. 
63 Mishkin, supra note 49, at 60. 
64 Id. at 62-63. 
65 Id. at 64. 
66 Id. at 61. 
67 Id. at 66. 
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would argue its necessity to achieve “needed modernization of the law,”68 the 
Blackstonian view would “tend to restrain a court from adopting new law that is neither 
reflective of current community standards nor adequately foreshadowed by prior judicial 
developments.”69  This, for Mishkin, was the appropriate pace of change, particularly in 
matters of constitutional law.70  I will return to a discussion of the effect of 
nonretroactivity rules on doctrinal development later.71 
Ironically, Mishkin approved of the result reached in Linkletter.72  But the reasoning – the 
abandonment of Blackstone in favor of Austin, as a means for rejecting retroactivity in 
favor of prospectivity – he found intolerable.  He also found it unnecessary, as the court’s 
three-factor retroactivity test failed to distinguish the case at hand, which came to the 
Court on federal habeas review, from the Mapp decision itself, which arose on direct 
review.  Application of the Linkletter test to Mapp, noted Mishkin, would have resulted 
in holding enforcement of the exclusionary rule in state-court criminal cases to be 
prospective, rather than retrospective as held in Mapp.73 
The problem facing the Court in Linkletter was not whether or not the Mapp rule would 
apply retroactively – that had already been done in Mapp –  but rather how the Court 
might justify retroactive application on direct review (as in Mapp) while avoiding it on 
federal habeas corpus (in Linkletter).  The Linkletter decision was nonresponsive to this 
problem.74  The Linkletter holding would be better justified, wrote Mishkin, not by the 
shift from Blackstonianism to Austinianism deployed in Linkletter, but by an analysis of 
the functions of habeas corpus.  Mishkin thus recast the problem from one of retroactivity 
versus prospectivity to one of the availability of habeas corpus relief.75 
Mishkin viewed the function of habeas corpus as varying, depending on the “intended 
effects”76 of the constitutional rule to be enforced.  Rules with the intended effects of                                                         
68 Id. at 70. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 70-71. 
71 Section III-D, infra. 
72 Id. at 102 (“The Linkletter result … seems quite sound – indeed, in part for reasons 
which its rationale tends to obscure.”). 
73 Id. at 76 (“[T]he Court's basic judgment that the purposes of the Mapp rule would not 
be advanced by retroactive application would have been equally valid in the Mapp case 
itself ….”). 
74 See Roosevelt (1999), supra note 18, at 1090 (“The Linkletter analysis is deeply 
unsatisfying. … it draws a distinction between cases on direct review and those in which 
a judgment is collaterally attacked that is simply impossible to justify within its own 
theoretical model.”). 
75 Id. at 77-78. 
76 Mishkin did allow that looking to the “intended effects” of a constitutional rule is not 
dramatically different from looking to the “purpose” of the rule, as in the Linkletter test.  
Mishkin, supra note 49, at 90; see also id. at 81 & n.85 (explaining that choice of 
“intended effects” rather than “purpose” is to allow consideration of the multiplicity of 
goals that may be served by a constitutional rule). 
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“insur[ing] that none but those guilty be convicted,”77 fall within the “prime function”78 
of habeas corpus, freedom from unjustified imprisonment.  Because the development of 
such rules expresses society’s developing standards for confidence in criminal matters, 
Mishkin believed it sensible that habeas corpus would assess the legality of confinement 
by the most current standards.79  
By contrast are rules not intended to promote reliability, but rather to “advance other 
objectives, such as respect for human dignity and integrity.”80  Protection of rights served 
by these constitutional rules, because not related to the reliability of the judgment, is not 
the central mission of habeas review.  However, Mishkin believed there still remained a 
need to rectify such constitutional violations on habeas – enforcement of federal law 
requires a federal forum, and the Supreme Court’s limited capacity demands that the 
district courts fulfill this enforcement role via habeas corpus.81  Because this 
“enforcement function” is a substitute for certiorari review, Mishkin found no reason to 
apply any rules not applicable on direct review.82 
Two points must be made regarding Mishkin’s focus on a rule’s intended effect with 
respect to “enhancing the reliability of the guilt-determining process.”83  The first is to 
note that Mishkin, like Bator, drew a sharp distinction between factual guilt or innocence 
and the adjudicative process used to arrive at a conclusion of guilt or innocence,84 and 
held that habeas should be concerned with the latter: “[D]espite the problems inherent in 
retrial of a defendant, especially after many years, there seems substantial basis for the 
proposition that habeas corpus should only inquire into the reliability of the earlier 
process of guilt-determination, rather than seek to determine the fact of guilt itself.”85 
                                                        
77 Mishkin, supra note 49, at 80 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria 
in Due Process Adjudication--A Survey and Criticism, 66 Yale L. J. 319, 346 (1957)). 
78 Id. at 79 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 401-02). 
79 Id. at 81-82.  “Valuing the liberty of the innocent as highly as we do, earlier 
proceedings whose reliability does not measure up to current constitutional standards for 
determining guilt may well be considered inadequate justification for continued 
detention.” Id. 
80 Id. at 86. 
81 Id. at 86-87. 
82 Id. at 87.  See also Yin, supra note 18, at 240-41 (“ Because the lower federal courts 
are essentially acting in place of the Court on direct review, the applicable constitutional 
standards are those that were in place at the time that the conviction would have been 
reviewed by the Court.”) (citing Mishkin, supra note 49, at 87).  One criticism of this 
approach is this: If habeas review is simply a delayed version of certiorari review, why 
should habeas courts not apply their best understanding of current law, just as the 
Supreme Court would on certiorari review? See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 
(1987), discussed infra notes 167-173.  
83 Id. at 82. 
84 Id. at 85-86. 
85 Id. at 86. 
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The second point flows from the first.  Because Mishkin is concerned with the reliability 
of the adjudicatory process rather than that of the ultimate guilt/innocence determination, 
it is not necessarily an easy task to determine which rules are intertwined with this 
reliability and which are not.  Thus, some constitutional rules might be primarily 
concerned with human dignity and integrity, implying a limited role for habeas review, 
but might nonetheless have a “substantial and intended impact” upon reliability, and 
therefore implicate the core concern of habeas review.86  I will resume discussion of the 
difficulty of determining which constitutional rules promote reliable verdicts and which 
promote other values below.87 
C. Expansion of the Linkletter nonretroactivity doctrine 
 
Despite criticism of Linkletter, the Court continued on its “retroactivity odyssey” not by 
contracting the rule of “selective prospectivity”88 set forth in Linkletter, but by expanding 
it in Johnson v. New Jersey89and Stovall v. Denno90 to a rule of general application, no 
matter the procedural posture of the case. 91  
Notably, Johnson and Stovall, like Linkletter, involved the question of retroactive 
application of exclusionary rules to state-court judgments.  Johnson concerned the rules 
announced in Escobedo v. Illinois92 and Miranda v. Arizona,93 requiring exclusion of 
confessions obtained through custodial interrogations under circumstances not                                                         
86 Id. at 81.  For example, the exclusion of involuntary confessions as violative of the 
privilege against self-incrimination is principally justified by a concern with systemic 
integrity, see, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (stating that the 
reason for excluding involuntary confessions is “not because such confessions are 
unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying 
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an 
inquisitorial system”); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999) (holding 
defendant may assert privilege in sentencing proceeding concerned with quantity of drugs 
trafficked, despite having pleaded guilty to the offense) (citing Rogers), but it has also 
been recognized that the privilege is not “divorced from the correct ascertainment of 
guilt.” Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (citations omitted). 
87 See infra notes 142, 204-220, 448-451, and accompanying text. 
88 “Selective prospectivity” is the application of a new rule to the litigants before the 
Court but not to others similarly situated. 
89 384 U.S. 719 (1966).   
90 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
91 As Professor Roosevelt writes: “Linkletter created an unstable situation. The 
inconsistency between its test and the rule of automatic retroactivity for direct review, 
coupled with the Court's inability to distinguish between the two contexts, meant that 
either the new test or the old rule would have to give way. Pushing forward might have 
seemed more productive than pulling back, and rather than rethink Linkletter, the Court 
expanded it.” Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18, at 1684. 
92 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
93 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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sufficiently protective of the accused’s right to remain silent, and came to the Court on 
certiorari review from the state postconviction track.94  The Court applied Linkletter and 
held the Escobedo and Miranda rules not retroactive.95  Stovall concerned the exclusion 
of lineup identifications obtained in violation of a defendant’s right to counsel as set forth 
in Gilbert v. California,96 and United States v. Wade.97 The Court in Stovall embraced 
“selective prospectivity,” announcing the decisions in Gilbert and Wade would apply 
retroactively to the litigants in those cases but prospectively in all other cases – i.e. only 
in cases where the lineups occurred after these decisions.98   Stovall further indicated that 
the three factors considered in Linkletter (the purpose of the “new” rule, the extent of 
reliance on the “old” rule, and the extent of disruption that would be caused by 
retroactive application) would comprise the retroactivity test in all cases, regardless of 
procedural posture.99 
Another way to read Linkletter and subsequent decisions is – rather than as innovative 
reasoning by the Supreme Court to achieve a “desirable result”100 – as defensive 
maneuvering to avoid a federalism crisis.101  Lower courts had already begun the process 
of denying retroactive application to the Warren Court’s criminal procedure reforms, as is 
evident in Linkletter and Johnson.  In both cases, the Court noted that state courts had 
                                                        
94 The Danforth dissent would read Johnson as an indication that the Court’s retroactivity 
jurisprudence was binding on state postconviction courts, 128 S.Ct. at 1049 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting), but the decision does not support this reading.  First, the petitioner did 
not argue against application of Linkletter, but instead argued that Escobedo broke no 
significant new ground and that retroactivity analysis was therefore irrelevant. 1966 WL 
87737 at *20-*21 (Brief for Petitioner).  Second, the procedural posture of the case would 
not support such a reading.  The New Jersey Supreme Court had denied retroactive effect 
to the Escobedo rule, but not on the basis of Supreme Court precedent.  The question 
before the Court, then, was not whether the New Jersey Court was obligated to follow 
Linkletter, but whether the Supreme Court would be required to effectuate Escobedo on 
certiorari review from the denial of state postconviction relief.  It is entirely consistent to 
read Johnson as indicating no more than that the Supreme Court would henceforth be 
applying the Linkletter test to cases in that procedural posture.  The Danforth majority 
points out that commentators and lower courts reached that conclusion, albeit by 
misreading a portion of Johnson meant to indicate that state courts could determine the 
retroactive effect of state-law protections more expansive than federal constitutional 
protections. 128 S.Ct. at 1039 & n.14 (discussing Johnson, 384 U.S. at 733). 
95 384 U.S. at 721. 
96 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
97 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
98 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300-01. 
99 Id. 
100 Mishkin, supra note 49, at 57-58. 
101 The Danforth majority’s characterization of Linkletter as adopting a “practical 
approach,” 128 S.Ct. at 1036, appears to be an understatement in this regard.  
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nearly unanimously declined to give retroactive effect to the Court’s new constitutional 
rules.102   
 
These state-court decisions set the stage for the Court’s doctrinal step that would take it 
away from retroactivity – the move from a declaratory model to a creative model of 
judging.  Writing before Linkletter, the New Jersey Supreme Court asserted its general 
power to legislate from the bench and eschewed Blackstone’s declaratory theory as a 
“splendid myth.”103 Other state courts presaged Linkletter’s rejection of the Blackstonian 
approach.104   
 
The Court’s conversion to prospectivity thus can be seen as driven from below, both 
jurisprudentially and politically.  In the face of massive opposition from the state courts, 
it seems likely the Court was concerned about its ability to actually enforce the 
retroactive application to the states of its procedural rulings in Mapp, Escobedo, 
Miranda, Gilbert and Wade.105   That it was driven by concerns particular to the inter-
system review of state-court judgments occasioned by federalism is essential to an 
understanding of why the Danforth decision is correct, and why retroactivity in the intra-
system review of state and federal postconviction proceedings should be reconsidered 
without reference to the Supreme Court’s “retroactivity odyssey.” 
                                                         
102 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 620 n.2; Johnson, 384 U.S. at 729 & n.10. 
103 State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 582, 206 A.2d 737, 742 (1965) (citation omitted). 
104 E.g., State v. Richter, 270 Minn. 307, 313, 133 N.W.2d 537, 541 (1965) (“[W]e do not 
subscribe to the philosophy that Mapp was the law in 1951, notwithstanding Blackstone 
….”); In re Lopez, 62 Cal.2d 368, 379, 398 P.2d 380, 388 (1965) (“We no longer 
subscribe to that ‘splendid myth’ of Blackstone that all constitutional interpretations are 
enternal verities that stretch backwards and forwards to infinity.”) (citations omitted). 
105 Professor Dow notes that prior to Linkletter, there were rumblings from individual 
Justices who believed the retroactivity issue should be addressed. Dow, supra note 18, at 
33 n.50. Justice Harlan was among them.  In Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 
(1963), Justice Harlan dissented from the Court’s per curiam grant of relief to two Florida 
prisoners in light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel binding on the states via the Fourteenth Amendment), 
arguing that given the “current swift pace of constitutional change, the time has come for 
the Court to deal definitively with” retroactivity.  375 U.S. at 4 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
The next year, in LaVallee v. Durocher, 377 U.S. 998 (1964), Justice Harlan would have 
granted certiorari to decide whether the circuit court erred by giving Gideon retroactive 
effect in federal habeas corpus review of state-court judgments. Id. at 998 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari); see United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964).  Thus, even while the Gideon holding had not instigated a 
federalism crisis (having been widely supported by the states, see Escobedo v. Illinois, 
378 U.S. 478, 487 n.8 (noting that twenty-two states had urged the Gideon result)), 
perhaps it was feared that retroactive application of Gideon might. See 1962 WL 115122 
at *22-23 (amicus brief of twenty-two states in Gideon, urging that the Court not give 
retroactive effect to the proposed rule). 
Forthcoming in 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. __ (2009) 
  18 
D. Justice Harlan’s criticism of the Stovall-Linkletter doctrine 
 
Criticisms of the Linkletter test – now applicable regardless of the procedural posture of 
the case – persisted.  Two opinions of Justice Harlan would shape the Court’s next 
steps.106 
 
In Desist v. United States,107 yet another decision concerning the scope of the 
exclusionary remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, the Court was called upon to 
consider the retroactivity of its decision in Katz v. United States,108 wherein the Court had 
abandoned the notion that the Fourth Amendment is only violated by some sort of 
physical trespass or invasion.  Desist was a federal narcotics prosecution in which agents 
used a microphone to record conversations in an adjoining hotel room.109  The case came 
to the Court on direct review, and the Court applied the Linkletter test110 to conclude the 
Katz rule should enjoy selective prospectivity – it would apply to the litigants in the case, 
but to no other case in which the search at issue pre-dated the Katz decision itself.111 
 
Justice Harlan dissented, and would have given Katz retroactive effect for all cases 
pending on direct review at the time of the decision.  In place of the “doctrinal confusion” 
spawned by Linkletter, Justice Harlan offered a “rethinking” of the issue.112 
 
Justice Harlan would have cast aside Stovall’s determination that Linkletter applied 
regardless of procedural posture, and reinstituted the divide between cases reaching the 
Court on direct review and those on federal habeas review.  For cases on direct review, 
Justice Harlan viewed retroactivity as the only possible solution.  Pure prospectivity 
would be a violation of the “case or controversy” requirement, and selective prospectivity 
offended principles of equality by treating similarly situated defendants differently.113 
 
For cases on federal habeas review, Justice Harlan’s approach relied heavily on 
Professors Bator and Mishkin.  Like Professor Bator, Justice Harlan saw the roots of the 
                                                        
106 See Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1039 (“[T]he opinions of Justice Harlan … provided the 
blueprint for [Justice O’Connor’s] entire analysis [in Teague v. Lane] ….”). 
107 394 U.S. 244 (1969). 
108 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
109 Id. at 244-45 & n.2. 
110 Featuring prominently in the calculus, of course, was the “deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule,” id. at 253, a rule which “’has no bearing on guilt’ or the ‘fairness of 
the trial.’” Id. at 254 n.24 (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 638); id. at 251 (“[T]he 
deterrent purpose of Katz overwhelmingly supports nonretroactivity ….”). 
111 Id. at 254. 
112 Id. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
113 Id. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“We depart from this basic judicial tradition 
when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants those who 
alone will receive the benefit of a ‘new’ rule of constitutional law.”). 
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retroactivity problem in Brown v. Allen and its expansion of federal habeas corpus.114  
And like Professor Mishkin, Justice Harlan relied on the functions of habeas review as 
distinguishing it from direct review and demanding distinct retroactivity rules.115 
 
Indeed, Justice Harlan adopted nearly entirely Mishkin’s analysis, describing the same 
functions for habeas review and urging adoption of the same retroactivity rules proposed 
by Mishkin.  Thus, for constitutional rules intended to enhance the reliability of verdicts, 
Justice Harlan would preserve full retroactivity.116 For rules not serving reliability, and 
for which the habeas court served merely as an enforcement mechanism,117 “the habeas 
court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original 
proceedings took place.”118 
 
Justice Harlan’s subsequent opinion in Mackey v. United States,119 while restating with 
increased vigor his belief that retroactivity on direct review was necessary, demonstrated 
a significant reformulation of his attitude toward retroactivity on habeas review.  Because 
there were actually three cases before the Court – one arising on direct review and two on 
collateral attack,120 Justice Harlan had ample opportunity to expound on how retroactivity 
ought to work in both settings.                                                         
114 Id. at 260-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Bator, supra note 25, at 463).  Ultimately, 
Justice Harlan believed that the “retroactivity problem” was “spawned” by Fay v. Noia. 
Id. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  But, he begins his history with Brown v. Allen.  
115 Id. at 260, 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
117 Justice Harlan’s language in describing this function of habeas review is significant. 
“[T]he threat of habeas,” wrote Justice Harlan, “serves as a necessary additional incentive 
for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner 
consistent with established constitutional standards.” Id. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).  Habeas review, in Justice Harlan’s view, served to “deter” state courts from 
constitutional violations. Id. at 263.  This view of habeas corpus is quite different from 
the vision of habeas as a means for “dialogue” between state and federal courts described 
by Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff, which I discuss below. See infra notes 226-
228, and accompanying text. 
118 Id. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Mishkin’s identical treatment is described 
above. See supra notes 77-82, and accompanying text.  Like Professor Mishkin, Justice 
Harlan does not explain why the “enforcement” function – which simply substitutes 
habeas review for certiorari review – does not implicate the full retroactivity rule 
proposed for direct review cases. See note 82, supra. 
119 401 U.S. 667, 675 et seq. (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and 
dissenting in part). 
120 The two cases arose from the federal postconviction track.  That Justice Harlan used 
these cases as an opportunity to expound on the proper scope of federal habeas review 
resulted in some unfortunate consequences, which are discussed below. See infra note 
463, and accompanying text.  Justice Harlan did not consider the significant differences 
between inter-system collateral review and intra-system collateral review, declaring the 
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For cases on direct review, Justice Harlan restated his position that the function of the 
Court – to decide constitutional questions in actual controversies before it – would be 
inconsistent with either pure prospectivity or selective prospectivity,121 either of which 
doctrines would mark an “inexplicable and unjustifiable departure from the basic 
principle upon which rests the institution of judicial review.”122  To this, Justice Harlan 
added a note as to some of the “untoward consequences” on doctrinal development 
occasioned by prospectivity.  Justice Harlan feared prospectivity would vitiate the lower 
courts’ “responsibility for developing or interpreting the Constitution.”123 A lower court 
would not venture to engage in doctrinal development, Justice Harlan believed, if it might 
be subject to reversal for applying such developments retroactively, even if only to the 
litigants in the case before the court.124  The lower courts would be “reduced largely to 
the role of automatons, directed by [the Supreme Court] to apply mechanistically all then-
settled federal constitutional concepts to every case before them.”125  To Justice Harlan, 
for the Court to arrogate to itself the exclusive power to develop constitutional law, and 
eliminate lower courts’ participation in this project, was “intolerable.”126  Furthermore, 
Justice Harlan worried that prospectivity would eliminate the incentives of litigants 
seeking modification of constitutional doctrines to pursue Supreme Court review.127 
While true to his Desist dissent as to cases arising on direct review, Justice Harlan’s 
opinion in Mackey with respect to cases arising from collateral attacks beat a significant 
retreat from his previous position.  While retaining a focus on the different function to be 
served by habeas – as contrasted with direct – review, Justice Harlan otherwise broke 
with Mishkin’s analysis, which had so heavily influenced his dissent in Desist.  The 
reason appears to be that Justice Harlan, frustrated with “a long course of habeas 
decisions in this Court which, I still believe, constitute an unsound extension of the 
historic scope of the writ and an unfortunate display of insensitivity to the principles of 
federalism which underlie the American legal system,”128 sought to achieve a restriction 
of the writ via the retroactivity problem.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
federal postconviction procedure – the motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255 –  
“virtually congruent” to federal habeas review of state-court judgments, and referring to 
both as “habeas corpus” throughout his opinion. Id. at 681 & n.1.  
121 Id. at 679 (Harlan, J.) (“Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, 
using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a 
stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule constitute an 
indefensible departure from this model of judicial review.”). 
122 Id. at 681. 




127 Id. at 681. 
128 Id. at 685; see also id. at 684 (stating that the retroactivity issues in the cases before 
the Court “must be considered as none other than a problem as to the scope of the habeas 
writ”). 
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As in Desist, Justice Harlan asserted that the starting point for considering retroactivity 
would be an assessment of the functions of habeas corpus.129  After once again reciting 
with some bitterness the recent expansion of the writ in Brown v. Allen and Fay v. 
Noia,130 and pointedly noting that his own views on the proper function of habeas corpus 
review had not been adopted by the Court,131 Justice Harlan caricaturized the prevailing 
view as being “that [habeas] provides a quasi-appellate review function”132 to “inquire 
into every constitutional defect” not waived or harmless.133  As in Desist, Justice Harlan 
insisted that nonretroactivity would be an appropriate general rule for such “quasi-
appellate review” directed primarily at enforcement of federal constitutional doctrine.134   
But in Desist, Justice Harlan had followed Mishkin and recognized the enforcement 
function as one of two functions served by habeas review, the other being the 
enhancement of reliability.135  Indeed Justice Harlan had advocated for retroactivity in 
cases where habeas review served to guarantee reliability.136  By summarizing prevailing 
habeas jurisprudence as concerned solely with providing “quasi-appellate” enforcement 
of federal law, Justice Harlan was able to cast aside that part of Mishkin’s analysis which 
would have preserved a measure of retroactivity on habeas review. 
Justice Harlan did insist on two exceptions to his proposed general rule of 
nonretroactivity on habeas review.  First, constitutional developments which place 
“certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal-
law making authority to proscribe” would enjoy retroactive application.137  Second, new 
constitutional rules “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” would be retroactive as 
well.138 
That Justice Harlan did not, in Mackey, preserve retroactivity for rules enhancing the 
reliability of criminal judgments, as he had in Desist, is perhaps the single most                                                         
129 Id. at 682, 684. 
130 Id. at 682-85. 
131 Id. at 685. 
132 Id. at 687. 
133 Id. at 685-86. 
134 Id. at 688-89.  Justice Harlan adjusted his proposed rule slightly – where in Desist the 
“enforcement” function of habeas was deemed to require only that the habeas court apply 
constitutional rules “prevail[ing] at the time the original proceedings took place,” Desist, 
394 U.S. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting), in Mackey Justice Harlan would have the “quasi-
appellate” habeas court apply rules “prevailing at the time a conviction became final.” 
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 689.  This revision goes halfway toward rectifying the illogic of 
Harlan’s Desist position noted above. See note 82, supra. Justice Harlan offered no 
reason why a petitioner who receives a substitute for certiorari review by a habeas court 
exercising the “quasi-appellate” function should not be entitled to have the habeas court 
apply the same retroactivity rule the Court would have on certiorari review. 
135 See supra, notes 116-118, and accompanying text. 
136 See supra, note 116, and accompanying text. 
137 Id. at 692-93. 
138 Id. at 693-94. 
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surprising shift between the two opinions.  Justice Harlan offered three explanations for 
this departure.  First, he once again adverted to his description of the prevailing function 
of habeas – as determined by Justice Harlan’s brethren on the Court – as no longer 
principally to inquire into guilt or innocence, but rather to serve the “quasi-appellate” 
function already discussed.139  Second, Justice Harlan placed an emphasis on finality in 
Mackey that he had not in Desist: “Finality in the criminal law is an end which must 
always be kept in plain view.”140 Justice Harlan believed this interest in finality would 
often outweigh even the reliability interest that would be served by retroactive application 
of constitutional rules “purportedly aimed at improving the factfinding process.”141 
Finally, Justice Harlan questioned the very distinction he had set forth (following 
Mishkin) in Desist, between rules designed to serve reliability and rules serving other 
values – in Mackey, Justice Harlan declared this distinction “inherently intractable.”142 
Justice Harlan’s emphasis on finality was buttressed by citations to Professor Bator’s 
work and to a 1970 article by Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit.143 Judge 
Friendly’s views strongly influenced the Court’s jurisprudence, for they resonated not 
only with Justice Harlan, but also with a second jurist who would shape the Court’s next 
attempt to rework retroactivity – Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. 
In his article, Judge Friendly took the position that “with a few important exceptions, 
convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his 
constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence.”144  While Professor Bator’s 
discussion of finality had been embedded in the context of inter-system review – federal 
habeas corpus – Judge Friendly began his analysis of finality in the intra-system review 
context, looking first at the federal postconviction track and then the state postconviction 
track.145   
 
Drawing heavily on Bator, Judge Friendly believed opportunities for collateral attack 
would impair the criminal law’s deterrent and rehabilitative functions.146  He also pointed 
out that the lengthy delays attended to postconviction litigation decreased the likelihood 
of accurate resolution of the issues raised, and made the possibility of a retrial “a matter 
of theory only.”147  Postconviction litigation also drains resources,148 Judge Friendly                                                         
139 Id. at 694. 
140 Id. at 690; see generally id. at 690-91 (citing, inter alia, Bator, supra note 25; Judge 
Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-151 (1970); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 
2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 384 (1964)). 
141 Id. at 694-95. 
142 Id. at 695. 
143 Id. at 690 (citing Friendly, supra note 140, at 146-51, and Bator, supra note 25). 
144 Friendly, supra note 140, at 142. 
145 Id. at 146. 
146 Id. at 146 & n.15. 
147 Id. at 146-47. 
148 Id. at 148. 
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wrote, though he was quick to point out that even his proposed reforms would not solve 
the problem entirely, as “narrow[ing] the grounds available for collateral attack would 
not necessarily discourage prisoners from trying.”149 
 
For all these reasons, Judge Friendly advocated limiting the availability of collateral 
attack to those prisoners who actually claimed to be innocent.  Importantly, though, Judge 
Friendly recognized four exceptions to this general rule.  First, Judge Friendly would 
permit collateral attack in cases where “the criminal process itself has broken down”150 – 
where, for example, there has been an unconstitutional denial of counsel,151 racial 
discrimination in jury selection,152 excessive publicity,153 or improper influence upon the 
jury.154   
 
Second, Judge Friendly would permit the raising on collateral attack of constitutional 
claims, the factual bases of which “are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment 
was not subject to consideration and review on appeal.”155  Such claims would include 
claims that a guilty plea was procured by improper means, that the prosecution 
knowingly introduced false evidence, or that the defendant was incompetent to stand 
trial.156 
 
Third, collateral attack should be available for “claims that the state has failed to provide 
proper procedure for making a defense at trial and on appeal,” of which Judge Friendly 
thought Jackson v. Denno157 to be the prime example.158 
 
Finally, Judge Friendly believed there could be an exception for new constitutional rules 
of criminal procedure which might apply retroactively.159  Interestingly, Judge Friendly 
did not perceive the lower courts (state or federal) as bound by the Supreme Court’s 
retroactivity jurisprudence (the issue ultimately decided in Danforth) – yet he still urged 
the lower courts to follow the lead of the Supreme Court: “While neither a state nor the 
United States is bound to limit collateral attack on the basis of a new constitutional rule 
of criminal procedure to what the Supreme Court holds to be demanded, I see no 
occasion to be holier than the pope.”160 
                                                         
149 Id. at 150. 
150 Id. at 151-52. 
151 Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). 
152 Id. (citing Brown v. Allen, supra). 
153 Id. (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US. 333 (1966)). 
154 Id. (citing Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966)). 
155 Id. at 152. 
156 Id; see also id. at 168 (suggesting that failure to permit postconviction review of such 
claims might amount to a due process violation). 
157 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
158 Friendly, supra note 140, at 152-53. 
159 Id. at 153-54. 
160 Id. at 154. 
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Judge Friendly’s views had a profound affect on the shaping of habeas corpus doctrine.161  
His proposition that habeas corpus carried a great cost to other systemic values, in 
particular the value of finality, which should be borne only for the sake of litigating 
claims of actual innocence, contributed to decisions of the Court declaring habeas relief 
unavailable for Fourth Amendment claims already fully litigated in state court,162 limiting 
successive habeas petitions to those involving a “colorable claim of factual innocence,”163 
and strengthening the procedural default doctrine as a restriction on habeas.164  And, after 
she had referenced Judge Friendly’s article in a number of decisions restricting habeas 
corpus,165 Justice O’Connor would rely on it once again in authoring the Court’s 
overthrow of the Linkletter retroactivity analysis in federal habeas corpus cases.166 
                                                        
161 The article was not influential for its promotion of the availability of collateral attack 
in the exceptional circumstances I have identified – a discussion to which I shall return 
below, see infra notes 321-335, and accompanying text – but rather for its general thesis 
that the function of collateral attack should be almost exclusively to release the “actually 
innocent” prisoner.  See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg,  Essay, Guilt: 
Henry Friendly Meets the MaHaRaL of Prague, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 604, 604-09 (1991) 
[hereinafter “Guilt”].  The Rosenbergs counter Friendly with an argument, the conclusion 
of which echoes the reliance of Bator and Mishkin on process: “[I]n our imperfect world 
there is only one kind of ascertainable guilt, and that is legal guilt.  The search for more is 
nothing less than arrogance.” Id. at 624-25 (citations omitted). 
162 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 & n.31 (1976) (“Resort to habeas corpus, 
especially for purposes other than to assure that no innocent person suffers an 
unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our 
system of government.”) (citing Friendly, supra note 140). 
163 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 455 (1986).  The Court specifically adopted Judge 
Friendly’s position that a factual showing of innocence on habeas requires consideration 
of “all the evidence” – both admissible and inadmissible. Id. at 455 & n. 17 (quoting 
Friendly, supra note 140, at 160). 
164 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1986) (citing Friendly, supra note 140, at 
147); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986) (citing Friendly, supra note 140, at 
146).   
165 Murray v. Carrier, supra; Smith v. Murray, supra; Engle v. Isaac, 456 US 107, 126 & 
n.31 (1982) (“[T]he Great Writ entails significant costs.”) (citing Friendly, supra note 
140, at 145); Id. at 127 & n.32 (“Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that this 
absence of finality also frustrates deterrence and rehabilitation.”) (citing Friendly, supra 
note 140, at 146; Bator, supra note 25, at 452); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 
(1991) (“‘[T]he Great Writ entails significant costs.’ The most significant of these is the 
cost to finality in criminal litigation that federal collateral review of state convictions 
entails ….”) (citations omitted). 
166 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“The fact that life and liberty are at stake 
in criminal prosecutions ‘shows only that “conventional notions of finality” should not 
have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation, not that they should have none.’”) 
(plurality opinion) (quoting Friendly, supra note 140, at 150). 
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E. Overthrow of the Linkletter-Stovall regime: 
Griffith v. Kentucky and Teague v. Lane 
 
The Court’s first major step in this direction, in its 1987 decision in Griffith v. 
Kentucky,167 was to abandon the Linkletter-Stovall test in cases reaching the Court on 
direct review.  Griffith concerned the retroactive application of the Court’s decision in 
Batson v. Kentucky,168 governing challenges to racially discriminatory jury selection 
practices.  The Court had previously determined, applying the Linkletter-Stovall analysis, 
that the Batson rule would not be given retroactive effect to cases on federal habeas 
corpus review.169 Griffith concerned whether the Batson rule would apply retroactively to 
cases pending on direct review.   
Embracing Justice Harlan’s arguments, the Court found that the nature of judicial review, 
and the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same, required retroactive 
application of new constitutional rules to all cases pending on direct review.170  The latter 
point was dramatically demonstrated by the facts – petitioner Griffith’s case arose out of 
the same local court as Batson’s had, and indeed the two cases challenged the 
discriminatory practices of the same prosecutor.171  Batson was tried three months before 
Griffith. “It was solely the fortuities of the judicial process that determined the case th[e] 
Court chose initially to hear on plenary review.”172  If ever a case exemplified Justice 
Harlan’s concern that “[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, 
using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a 
stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule” would be an 
“indefensible departure”173 from the accepted model of judicial review, it was Griffith’s. 
If Griffith put a knife in the heart of the Linkletter-Stovall doctrine, the corpse was 
officially put to rest with the Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane174 and its immediate 
progeny.  In a plurality opinion that subsequently garnered a majority of votes on the 
Court, 175 Justice O’Connor incorporated, with only slight alteration, the retroactivity 
rules for federal habeas corpus review that Justice Harlan had proposed in Mackey.176                                                          
167 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
168 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
169 Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258-61 (1986). 
170 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322-23 (citing, inter alia, Desist, 394 U.S. at 256 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)). 
171 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 327. 
172 Id. 
173 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in 
part). 
174 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
175 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); 
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409 (1990).   
176 Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-10; Id. at 310 (“… we now adopt Justice Harlan's view of 
retroactivity for cases on collateral review.”). 
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Thus, after Teague, new constitutional rules are by default not retroactively applicable to 
cases on federal habeas review.  Like Justice Harlan, Justice O’Connor recognized two 
exceptions, the first identical to Justice Harlan’s exception for “substantive” changes in 
the law,177 the second narrower, demanding for retroactive application not only that a 
new constitutional rule be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” but also that it bear 
on the accuracy of the conviction.178 
Justice O’Connor relied on comity considerations in adopting Justice Harlan’s view of 
the functions of habeas corpus.179  In addressing finality, she relied not only on Justice 
Harlan, but also on the antecedent work that had been so influential in Harlan’s Mackey 
opinion – the scholarship of Professor Bator and Judge Friendly.  “Application of 
constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously 
undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal 
justice system,” Justice O’Connor wrote. “Without finality, the criminal law is deprived 
of much of its deterrent effect.” 180 
Teague also broke ranks with the Linkletter-Stovall doctrine in its treatment of 
retroactivity as a threshold question. “Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold 
question,” Justice O’Connor explained, “for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant 
in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied 
retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”181 Teague attempted to serve this interest 
in treating similarly situated defendants the same by preventing the development of 
doctrine on habeas review: “We therefore hold that, implicit in the retroactivity approach 
we adopt today, is the principle that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create 
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be applied                                                         
177 Id. at 311. 
178 Id. at 311-14.  See Roosevelt (1999), supra note 18, at 1096 (noting that Teague 
combined Justice Harlan’s Desist exception, which questions whether a new rule 
promotes accuracy, with his Mackey exception, wherein he abandoned the former in 
favor of the “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” formulation); Roosevelt (2007), 
supra note 18, at 1693-94 (“Teague combined the two Harlan formulations, an innovation 
with little obvious justification other than, perhaps, that a conjunction is harder to satisfy 
than either element alone.”). But see Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 25.7 at 1022 
(describing the Teague plurality as favoring Justice Harlan’s Desist formulation, and the 
combining of the Desist and Mackey formulations as occurring post-Teague). 
179 Teague, 489 U.S. at 308; see also id. at 310 (noting the burdens on state courts 
occasioned by retroactive application of new constitutional rules in federal habeas 
proceedings); see also infra notes 248-250, and accompanying text (discussing Danforth 
majority’s reading of Teague as primarily concerned with comity). 
180 Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (citing Friendly, supra note 140, at 150; Bator, supra note 25, 
at 450-51; Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691 ((Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
181 Id. at 300.  See id. (“In our view, the question ‘whether a decision [announcing a new 
rule should] be given prospective or retroactive effect should be faced at the time of [that] 
decision.’”) (alteration in original) (citing Mishkin, supra note 49, at 64). 
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retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two exceptions we 
have articulated.”182  Under Linkletter and Stovall, the Court had often announced new 
constitutional criminal rules in federal habeas cases;183 this would no longer be permitted 
after Teague.  Through the recasting of retroactivity as a threshold test, Teague permitted 
the Court to adopt a regime of prospectivity without incurring what the Court may have 
viewed as the principal cost of prospectivity -- accelerated constitutional change.184  
F. Criticism of Teague 
 
Although the Court had now “reformed” its retroactivity doctrine, somewhat responsively 
to the concerns of critics like Professor Bator and Professor Mishkin, the new 
retroactivity rules set forth in Teague prompted scathing criticism.185  There were three 
aspects of Teague that drew fire and are particularly relevant to any discussion of what 
should happen after Danforth. 
The critics began by decrying the very first step in the Teague inquiry – determining 
whether the constitutional rule a habeas petitioner seeks to apply is, in fact, a “new” rule.  
Arguably the Teague decision itself is not to blame for this problem; any retroactivity 
inquiry after Linkletter involved a threshold question as to whether a rule was sufficiently 
“new” to trigger the three-factor test announced there.186  But Teague made matters 
worse, according to its critics, by defining a “new rule” in two contradictory ways, each 
representing one end of the “newness” spectrum.187  Under Teague, a new rule is one 
which either “breaks new ground” or is “not dictated by precedent.”188  The former 
definition appears relatively narrow, limiting new rules to those which break with past 
precedent, while the latter is obviously quite broad.189   
                                                        
182 Id. at 316. 
183 Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity 
Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the 
Court's Doctrine, 35 N. Mex. L. Rev. 161, 190 (2005) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 334-35 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION § 15.5.1, at 897-99, 898 n.10  (4th ed. 2003). 
184 Prospectivity has been viewed as allowing courts to “cut free from precedent and 
change the law in much the way that a legislature would.”  Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 
18, at 1802. See also supra notes 68-71, and accompanying text. 
185 See Yin, supra note 18, at 206 n.11 (collecting articles). 
186 See Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 18, at 1742 (describing the “new” rule inquiry as a 
“threshold uncertainty” contributing to the unpredictability of the Linkletter-Stovall era); 
see also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 (1984), cited in Fallon and Meltzer, supra 
note 18, at 1742 n.47 (“At just what point of predictability local authorities should be 
expected to anticipate a future decision has been unclear, however.”). 
187 Blume, supra note 18, at 588. 
188 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis original). 
189 See Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 25.5 at 974-75. 
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In a trio of decisions decided the year after Teague, the Court seemed to settle 
definitively on the broader definition of “new rule.”190  Commentators remarked that 
“[t]he breadth of the Court's conception of what counts as ‘new’ law has restricted habeas 
jurisdiction to cases involving routine legal questions.”191  While subsequent decisions 
may have retreated from that extreme, the Court’s inconsistency192 has “left the lower 
courts floundering,”193 causing some to declare the “new rule” test “little more than [a] 
screen[] for covert rulings on the merits ….”194  Criticism of the Court’s implementation 
of the “new rule” criterion has been widespread.195 
A broad concept of “new rule” is particularly troubling when coupled with the very 
narrow exceptions to Teague nonretroactivity – the second point which scholars attacked.  
The first Teague exception – for “substantive” changes in the law – has been 
noncontroversial.196  It is Teague’s second exception, for “watershed” rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure, that has been criticized as overly narrow.197  
The Teague plurality’s blending of Justice Harlan’s Desist and Mackey formulations198 
results in an exception so narrow it has been described as “virtually non-existent.”199 
                                                        
190 See id. at 979-81 (discussing Butler v. McKellar, supra; Saffle v. Parks, supra; and 
Sawyer v. Smith, supra). 
191 Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 18, at 1734; Id. at 1747-48 (noting that implementation 
of “new rule” requirement in Sawyer v. Smith prevented habeas courts not only from 
making “clear break” from the past but also from imposing “gradual” developments); Id. 
at 1816 (criticizing Teague definition of “new rule” as “too expansive”). 
192 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 25.5 at 981-93. 
193 Id. at 993. 
194 Id.; see also Yin, supra note 18, at 287 (“…Teague and its progeny have failed to 
provide sufficient guidance for determining when a rule is new, thus leaving federal 
courts a zone of discretion with which they can make outcome determinative decisions 
without necessarily reaching the merits of the claims.”). 
195 E.g., Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18, at 1690-93; Blume, supra note 18, at 596 
(noting the Court’s view “that any resolution and rejection of an intellectually tenable 
distinction of its cases creates a new rule” would “both distort[] the way constitutional 
adjudication takes place and circumvents the analytical basis of Teague.”); Entzeroth, 
supra note 183, at 212 (“As fifteen years of Teague have taught, the new rule doctrine is 
interpreted in such an extraordinarily broad manner that it is removed from the traditional 
concerns and concepts that gave rise to retroactivity limits in general and in the context of 
habeas corpus proceedings in particular.”). 
196 See, e.g. Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18 at 1693; Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 
25.7 at 1021. 
197 Hertz and Liebman suggest that the narrow “watershed” exception tracks exceptions 
to the procedural default and harmless error rules, a point of some interest when one 
considers whether those doctrines serve the same interests the Teague rule purports to.  
Supra note 18, § 25.7 at 1024-28. 
198 See note 178, supra and accompanying text. 
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Professor David Dow has argued that by framing the second exception in terms of 
innocence or guilt, the Teague plurality relied on “a deeply flawed epistemology.”200  
Echoing the concerns of Professors Bator and Mishkin – that courts are capable of 
assessing only the process used to determine guilt or innocence, rather than factual guilt 
or innocence itself201 – Professor Dow takes the Court to task for “confus[ing] ‘guilty’ 
with an empirical proposition.”202 Teague should exclude from its ambit, in Dow’s view, 
any rule – procedural or substantive -- that affects the adjudicative process for 
determining guilt or punishment.203 
To an extent, this formulation is more true to Justice Harlan’s views than Teague.  Justice 
Harlan, after all, had relied extensively on Professors Bator and Mishkin.  In Desist, 
therefore, Justice Harlan’s focus on accuracy was described in terms of process, not 
actual guilt or innocence.204  And in Mackey, Justice Harlan turned even further toward 
Bator’s process model, declaring the question of what rules serve accuracy “intractable” 
and crafting his second exception to embrace rules essential to the “adjudicatory 
process.”205  While Justice Harlan’s exception is substantially narrower than Professor 
Dow would have drawn it – principally in order to serve finality206 – the approach is 
similar. 
The Court’s recent retroactivity decisions have demonstrated that the Court will not 
adhere to the “process” view of reliability.  In Schriro v. Summerlin,207 the majority and 
dissent pitted the actual innocence view against the process view of reliability.  The Court 
held its decision in Ring v. Arizona,208 that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury (not a 
judge) to find aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the death penalty,209 is not 
to be retroactively applied to cases on federal habeas review.210    
The Summerlin dissenters believed the Ring rule satisfied Teague’s second exception for 
rules “central to an accurate determination,”211 because “a death sentence must reflect a 
community-based judgment that the sentence constitutes proper retribution.”212  This                                                                                                                                                                      
199 Entzeroth, supra note 183, at 195-96; see also Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18, at 
1693 (“[N]o new procedural rule has yet satisfied the Teague exception, and the Court 
has strongly intimated that none shall.”). 
200 Dow, supra note 18, at 39-41. 
201 See supra notes 28-29 and 84-85, and accompanying text. 
202 Dow, supra note 18, at 40. 
203 Id. at 41. 
204 Desist, supra, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing habeas as concerned 
with the “procedure” or “fact-finding apparatus” employed by the trial court). 
205 Mackey, supra, 401 U.S. at 693-95. 
206 See supra, notes 140-143, and accompanying text. 
207 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
208 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
209 Id. at 609. 
210 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 358. 
211 542 U.S. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 313). 
212 Id. at 360 (citations omitted). 
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view of an “accurate determination” is process based, recognizing there is no objectively 
correct answer where capital sentencing is concerned, only a collection of procedures 
(including jury determination of all facts necessary for the imposition of the death 
sentence) intended to result in a “community-based judgment.”   
The Summerlin majority, by contrast, believes in objective accuracy, rejecting the 
dissent’s focus on “community-based judgment”213 and focusing on whether juries are so 
superior to judges in their factfinding abilities as to “so ‘seriously diminish[]’ accuracy 
that there is an ‘“‘impermissibly large risk’”’ of punishing conduct the law does not 
reach.”214 
The Court’s rejection of the process model of reliability is also apparent in Whorton v. 
Bockting.215  There the Court held its 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington,216 
dramatically revising its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, would not be applied 
retroactively on habeas review.  The Court’s 1980 ruling in Ohio v. Roberts217 had 
permitted courts to admit into evidence the out-of-court statement of an unavailable 
witness – dispensing with confrontation – in situations where the statement bore 
“adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”218  In Crawford, the Court retrenched, discarding the 
Roberts focus on “indicia of reliability” and holding that confrontation is required where 
the out-of-court statement is “testimonial” in nature, unless the prosecution can 
demonstrate both the unavailability of the declarant and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination of the declarant by the defendant.  
In Bockting, however, the Court once again distinguished actual reliability from the 
process model of reliability.  Although Crawford held that “[w]here testimonial 
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation,”219 the Court in 
Bockting downplayed the relationship between the Crawford rule and accuracy.220 
Summerlin and Bockting thus demonstrate that the Court will continue to hew to an 
overly narrow interpretation of the second Teague exception. 
Finally, Teague’s recharacterization of retroactivity as a “threshold” test has also drawn 
enormous critical attention.221  While commentators have found plenty of reasons to                                                         
213 542 U.S. at 357. 
214 Id. at 355-56. 
215 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007). 
216 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
217 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
218 Id. at 66. 
219 Crawford at 68-69. 
220 Whorton, 127 S.Ct. at 1183 (“[T]he overall effect of Crawford with regard to the 
accuracy of fact-finding in criminal cases is not easy to assess.”). 
221 “There is considerable consensus among commentators … that Teague’s ‘threshold 
question’ rule is misguided.” Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 25.4 at 964 n.24 (citing 
authorities). 
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dislike the threshold test concept,222 perhaps the most widely shared criticism is based on 
a recognition that treating the retroactivity inquiry as a threshold test has dramatic 
implications for the development of constitutional doctrine.223  As I have already noted, 
Justice Harlan observed the doctrine-freezing effect of prospectivity –fearing it would 
reduce the lower courts to “automatons” and relieve them of their obligation to develop 
constitutional doctrine.224  Teague’s threshold test accomplished this with a flourish.225 
Prior to Teague, it was possible to conceive of federal habeas review as a “dialogue” 
between state and federal courts, one which “required both to speak and listen as equals,” 
226 and to treat the other with “mutual respect and awareness.”227  This dialogue was the                                                         
222 Id. at 963-71 (discussing eight reasons for abandoning the threshold test rule). 
223 Toby Heytens, for example, while noting the serious problems that accompany a 
selective prospectivity regime, Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in 
Criminal Cases, 115 Yale L.J. 922, 987-90 (2006), nonetheless advocates for selective 
prospectivity, in large part because of his belief that “applying new rules in the cases in 
which they are announced is necessary to promote development in the law.” Id. at 983-
84. 
224 Supra note 125 and accompanying text. Justice Harlan made these in Mackey while 
arguing for retroactivity on direct review – on federal habeas review, he apparently felt 
these concerns would be outweighed by the finality interest that motivated him to 
propose a rule of general prospectivity with limited exceptions. 
225 See James S. Liebman, More Than “Slightly Retro:” The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of 
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 537, 
575 (1990/1991) (predicting Teague’s threshold test would “forbid lower federal judges 
from interpreting the United States Constitution in habeas corpus cases and would 
relegate those judges to the nearly ministerial task of putting into operation decisions that 
the Supreme Court renders on direct review.”); Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 25.5 
at 970-71 (“The plurality approach forbids judges to interpret the United States 
Constitution in habeas corpus cases and relegates those judges to the virtually ministerial 
task of putting into operation decisions that the Supreme Court renders on direct 
review.”) 
226 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus 
and the Court, 86 Yale L. J. 1035, 1036 (1977).  Professor Giovanna Shay and I have 
thoroughly discussed the “dialectical federalism” paradigm described by Cover and 
Aleinikoff, and its demise at the hands of AEDPA.  Shay & Lasch, supra note 17.  
227Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 226, at 1048.  This vision of habeas review as a 
dialogue between equals is radically different from the vision expressed by Justice Harlan 
in Desist, of habeas as a “threat” which would “serve[] as a necessary incentive for [state] 
courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with 
established constitutional standards.” Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
This “deterrence function” view led Justice Harlan to believe a habeas court  “need only 
apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took 
place.” Id. at 263.  This is not a dialogue between mutually respecting equals, but a 
parent-child relationship in which the federal courts serve to correct the misbehavior of 
the state courts.  Allowing the habeas court to “say what the law is” (i.e. apply current, 
Forthcoming in 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. __ (2009) 
  32 
engine for doctrinal development: “[T]he Supreme Court might ‘define the values from 
which a dialogue will proceed,’ but it would be the ‘ensuing dialogue’ between lower 
federal courts and state courts that would have the ‘profound impact on the development 
of constitutional law.’”228   
Teague’s threshold test, however, substantially impairs this process.229 “[I]t eliminates a 
previously available federal forum in which state prisoners may argue for new federal 
procedural rules.”230  Thus, even if a federal habeas court is inclined to narrowly define 
what constitutes a “new rule,”231 the incentive for litigators after Teague is to avoid 
arguing for doctrinal development, framing habeas claims instead, insofar as possible, as 
dictated by precedent.232  (In 1996, Congress took one more doctrine-freezing step, 
codifying in AEDPA an even stricter version of the Teague rule).233 
                                                                                                                                                                     
even if new, constitutional rules) – rather than grading the performance of the state court 
– is  necessary to the dialectical federalism described by Cover and Aleinikoff.  
228 Shay & Lasch, supra note 17 at 219 (quoting Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 226, at 
1065). 
229 This is not surprising, given that Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion explicitly 
endorsed the view of habeas review as serving a “deterrence function.”  Teague, 489 U.S. 
at 306 (O’Connor, J.)(quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).   
230 Entzeroth, supra note 183, at 191.  I quote this passage because I find it a suitably 
modest statement of the impact of the threshold test.  While I believe this impact is quite 
significant, it is surprisingly easy to overstate the case.  For example, Entzeroth goes on: 
“If habeas is no longer an avenue for the establishment of new rules, only those few 
direct appeal cases in which the Court grants certiorari will be available for the 
development of criminal procedure rules.” Id.  This ignores the opportunities for doctrinal 
development in the lower courts when they consider cases on direct (and possibly 
postconviction) review.  Such doctrinal development can even be effectuated on federal 
habeas.  Under Teague (but not under AEDPA), the decisions of the lower federal courts 
developing doctrine constitute the body of “old law” which federal habeas courts can 
apply. See Shay & Lasch, supra note 17, at 223, 232 n.126 (noting difference between 
AEDPA and Teague); Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, 
Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 535, 588-93 (1999) 
(discussing AEDPA’s more restrictive provisions).  Similarly, I find some overstatement 
in Professor Yin’s assertion that Teague’s threshold test means “the lower federal courts 
are essentially removed from the development of constitutional law. … [T]he dialogue 
between federal courts and state courts … is lost.” Yin, supra note 18, at 283 (citing 
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 226, at 1050-53; Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 
Hastings L. J. 941, 1016-18 (1991)).  Even after Teague, lower courts still have 
opportunities for developing the law – certainly on direct review and, as I discuss below, 
also on postconviction review, thanks to the Danforth decision. 
231 See supra notes 186-195, and accompanying text (noting malleability of “new rule” 
concept). 
232 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 18, at 1804 (“[D]octrines that withhold remedies when a 
claimant relies on new law curtail the incentive for litigants to raise novel arguments 
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Removing federal habeas review as a “locus for the development of new rules of criminal 
procedure“234 creates pressures elsewhere in the system.  As will be discussed more fully 
below, unless the lower courts ensure that state postconviction and federal postconviction 
review continue as loci for doctrinal development, the general tendency is, as Justice 
Harlan noted, for consolidation of interpretive power in the Supreme Court.235  This is 
particularly troublesome because without the constitutional dialogue that occurs when 
lower courts are empowered to develop doctrine, the Supreme Court will be unguided in 
this task.236 
All of these criticisms ultimately reflect the fact that the Teague rule is more a product of 
historical happenstance than a coherent jurisprudential doctrine.  Its roots are in the 
expansion of federal habeas review, well nourished by strong reaction to the dramatic 
developments in constitutional criminal doctrine effected by the Warren Court – 
especially the exclusionary rule.  One sad irony to this tale is that the Court in its 1976 
decision in Stone v. Powell237 effectively abolished federal habeas review of Fourth 
Amendment claims, demonstrating – if one assumes the concerns about application of the 
exclusionary rule to the states were well founded238 – an entirely different solution to the 
initial problem the Court faced in Linkletter.  The story of the Court’s retroactivity 
jurisprudence might have been entirely different – indeed, it might never have taken place 
at all239 – had the Court not been facing political forces agitated by the enforcement of the 
exclusionary rule within the federalist structure of the justice system.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
….”); Id. at 1819; see also Mishkin, supra note 49, at 61; Mackey, 401 U.S. at 681 
(Harlan, J.). 
233 See Shay & Lasch, supra note 17, at 223-24 & nn. 64-66, 232 n.126. 
234 Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State 
Postconviction Remedies, 44 Alabama L. Rev. 421, 423 (1993). 
235 See supra notes 123-126, and accompanying text. 
236 Blume, supra note 18, at 584 (“Since the lower courts will be removed from the 
process of interpreting the Constitution, the burden of this task will fall onto the Supreme 
Court ….. But the Court will have to render its judgments on ‘new’ rules without the 
benefit of the opinions of the lower federal courts.”).  See also Chen, supra note 230 at 
633 (“Teague’s decisionmaking structure … diminished the deliberative function of 
constitutional standards, impeded the growth of constitutional law, and may, ironically, 
have undermined the very deterrent impact it heralded by clouding understanding of 
law.”). 
237 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
238 I do not, but that is neither here nor there for purposes of this Article. 
239 See Mishkin, supra note 49, at 57-58 (describing the Court's prior instincts in taking 
retroactivity for granted as “overborne [in Linkletter] by the felt need to support a 
desirable result”); Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18, at 1679 (describing Linkletter as 
“crafted to solve a particular problem-- to prevent habeas petitioners from claiming the 
benefits of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure.”). 
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II. THE DANFORTH DECISION: TEAGUE DOES 
NOT BIND THE STATE COURTS 
 
What brought the parties in Danforth to the Supreme Court, at bottom, was the question 
whether Crawford v. Washington,240 and its dramatically revised Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence, would be applied retroactively to invalidate the final judgment of a state 
prisoner.   
Stephen Danforth, a Minnesota inmate who had been convicted on the strength of a 
videotaped interview with a six-year-old child who did not testify at trial, filed a state 
postconviction petition claiming this trial procedure failed the newly announced 
Crawford test.241  Both the state postconviction trial court and the intermediate appellate 
court applied Teague and concluded that Crawford was a “new rule” that would not be 
applied retroactively to Danforth’s case on collateral review.242  On discretionary review, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court considered – and rejected – Danforth’s argument that 
Teague applies only to limit the scope of federal habeas review “and does not limit the 
retroactive application of new rules in state postconviction proceedings.”243  The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider this single issue: “Are state supreme 
courts required to use the standard announced in Teague [] to determine whether United 
States Supreme Court decisions apply retroactively to state-court criminal cases, or may a 
state court apply state-law- or state-constitution-based retroactivity tests that afford 
application of Supreme Court decisions to a broader class of criminal defendants than the 
class defined by Teague?”244 
 
A. The key notes struck by the majority opinion 
 
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for a 7-2 majority, with Chief Justice Roberts 
writing a dissent joined by Justice Kennedy.  The decision holds Teague does not bind 
the state courts:245 Teague “limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an 
individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a                                                         
240 541 U.S. 36 (2004), discussed supra notes 216-220 and accompanying text. 
241 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1033.  Danforth had previously argued that the introduction of 
the child’s videotaped statement violated his Confrontation Clause rights as set forth in 
Ohio v. Roberts; this argument was rejected on direct review. Id.   
242 Id.; Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. App. 2005). 
243 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1033-34 & n.2 (quoting Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 
455-57 (Minn. 2006)). 
244Danforth v. Minnesota, 127 S.Ct. 2427 (Mem) (2007); 2006 WL 4541279 at *i 
(Petition for Writ of Certiorari).  As noted above, see supra notes 216-220, and 
accompanying text, the Court had already held Crawford to be nonretroactive on federal 
habeas review. 
245 My discussion of the Danforth opinion is not intended to be exhaustive.  There are 
many interesting facets to the decision; however, I have attempted – no doubt not entirely 
successfully – to limit my discussion to that which is necessary for the discussion in 
Sections III-V, infra. 
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state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a 
violation that is deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague.”246 
 
The result was not surprising.  As the majority correctly noted, the Teague rule is rooted 
in considerations of comity.247  It is “abundantly clear,” wrote the Court, “that the Teague 
rule of nonretroactivity was fashioned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while 
minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings.  It was intended to limit the 
authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions ….”248 Even Chief Justice 
Roberts in dissent conceded the majority correctly found Teague’s roots in comity.249  
Because the rule is an attempt to reconcile the functions of federal habeas review with 
considerations of comity, it makes little sense to hold the rule binding upon state 
postconviction courts.250 
 
But while the outcome of Danforth was no surprise, there are two striking features of the 
majority opinion which evidence a shift in the Court’s retroactivity analysis – a return to 
the Blackstonian “declaratory” theory of judging,251 and a movement toward 
consideration of the retroactivity question through the lens of the law of remedies.252 
 
The opinion begins and ends with an assertion of the “declaratory” theory of judging.  
“We begin with a comment on the source of the ‘new rule’ announced in Crawford,”                                                         
246 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1042. 
247 Id. at 1040-41; see Section I, supra. 
248 Id. at 1041; see generally id. at 1040-42. 
249 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1052 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 
308).  The Chief Justice argued, however, that “there was more to Teague than [comity],” 
stressing finality concerns. Id.  I address the dissent’s finality argument below. See 
Section III-F, infra. 
250 Id. at 1041 (“Federalism and comity considerations are unique to federal habeas 
review of state convictions.”) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 475, 609 A.2d 1280, 
1292 (1992) for the proposition that comity and federalism concerns “simply do not 
apply” to intra-system review in state court). 
251 The return to Blackstone’s “declaratory” model is, of course, thanks to Professor 
Mishkin. See Section I-B, supra. 
252 Although the Court does not explicitly acknowledge the impetus for this conceptual 
shift, the focus on remedies marks an implicit attempt to adapt the Court’s retroactivity 
jurisprudence to the post-Teague suggestions of commentators.  Professors Fallon and 
Meltzer advocated this reframing of the retroactivity question, see supra note 18, and 
Professor Roosevelt also employs the approach. Roosevelt (1999), supra note 18, at 1108 
(“[R]emedial analysis is the only acceptable route to prospective results ….”); Roosevelt 
(2007), supra note 18, at 1678 (“We ought not to think in terms of retroactivity at all. 
Instead, we need only ask, according to our best current understanding of the law, 
whether [the trial court] violated the constitutional rights of individual defendants, and if 
so, whether those wrongs merit a remedy.”).  The roots of the argument can be traced to 
Professor Mishkin. See supra note 75. 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Justice Stevens wrote.253  The point of this comment, it turns out, is not so much to trace 
the history of Crawford (that is done quite cursorily), but rather to embrace Blackstone’s 
declaratory theory: The Crawford rule was emphatically not, concluded Justice Stevens, 
“a rule ‘of our own devising’ or the product of our own views about sound policy.”254  
After setting the stage in this dramatic manner, the opinion moves directly into a 
discussion of the “somewhat confused and confusing ‘retroactivity’ cases decided in the 
years between 1965 and 1987.”255  The reference to 1965, of course, is a reference to 
Linkletter, the decision assailed by Professor Mishkin for its abandonment of the 
Blackstonian “declaratory” theory.256 
 
Yet, the opinion’s emphasis on declaring rather than creating constitutional law portends 
something more than a simple repudiation of the theoretical misstep which launched 
some twenty years257 of “confused and confusing” doctrine.  This is particularly evident 
given the prominent return to Blackstonian theory at the end of the opinion, immediately 
before announcing the Court’s judgment: 
 
A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague 
does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of 
trial – only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts. It is fully 
consistent with a government of laws to recognize that the finality of a judgment may 
bar relief. It would be quite wrong to assume, however, that the question whether 
constitutional violations occurred in trials conducted before a certain date depends on 
how much time was required to complete the appellate process.258 
 
The return to Blackstone’s “declaratory” theory of judging is emphasized because it is 
intended to do serious work for the Court.  Although Chief Justice Roberts criticized the 
majority’s adherence to declaratory judging as having “nothing to do with the question” 
before the Court,259 the majority opinion uses the Blackstonian model as a means of 
accomplishing the second shift apparent in Danforth – the shift from “retroactivity” to 
“redressability.”  Because “new rules” are discovered, not created – and are therefore not                                                         
253 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1034. 
254 Id. at 1035. 
255 Id. 
256 See supra notes 57-65, and accompanying text. 
257 Twenty-two years, per Justice Stevens. Forty-three years and counting, per the 
commentators (including myself).  
258 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1047.  The opinion also quotes extensively Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990), 
in which Justice Scalia embraced the declaratory theory, arguing that the contrary view – 
“a view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law 
already is” – violates Article III.  Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1044. Justice Scalia also wrote, 
“the Constitution does not change from year to year, since it does not conform to our 
decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it ….” Id. (quoting American 
Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
259 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1056 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
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really “new,” the “retroactivity” determination is “not [a determination of] the temporal 
scope of a newly announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occurred prior 
to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief 
sought.”260 
 
The shift from “retroactivity” to “redressability” pervades the majority opinion and, as 
the dissent noted, allows the Danforth majority to cast the retroactivity question as a state 
law question: “[T]he remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of 
the Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law.”261 The shift is most evident 
in the subtle difference in terminology between the question presented to the Court, 
framed in terms of the applicability of new decisions,262 and the Court’s holding, framed 
in terms of state courts’ authority to provide a remedy for violation of a constitutional 
rule.263 As the opinion points out, “retroactivity” questions are framed as questions of 
whether new law applies to create new error in old convictions, whereas “redressability” 
questions recognize the error of the past and simply wonder whether a remedy will be 
provided.264 
 
Intent on recasting retroactivity as redressability, the Danforth majority engaged in a bit 
of revisionist history.   Surveying the history of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence 
from Linkletter to Teague, Justice Stevens concluded with this astonishing statement: “It 
is clear that Linkletter and then Teague considered what constitutional violations may be 
remedied on federal habeas.”265  To read Linkletter and Teague as redressability 
decisions, however, is impossible.  The opinions are framed in terms of the application of 
new rules to old judgments, and not in terms of availability of remedies.266  While Justice 
Stevens did urge an analysis that would first consider whether error had occurred, and 
then proceed to the question of remedy, in his concurring opinion in Teague,267 this                                                         
260 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1035. 
261 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1056 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 
1045).  
262 See supra, note 244, and accompanying text. 
263 See supra, note 246, and accompanying text. 
264 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1035 & n.5.   
265 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1038. 
266 E.g. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (O’Connor, J.) (“new constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new 
rules are announced”); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 (“[W] we are concerned only with 
whether the exclusionary principle enunciated in Mapp applies to state court convictions 
which had become final before rendition of our opinion”) (citation omitted); Id. at 640 
(“After full consideration of all the factors we are not able to say that the Mapp rule 
requires retrospective application.”). 
267 Teague, 489 U.S. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).  It must be noted that the 
position put forth by Justice Stevens in Teague is only superficially related to the position 
set forth in Danforth, however.  Justice Stevens’ emphasis on the ordering of the inquiry 
was a pragmatic response to Justice O’Connor’s insistence that retroactivity should be a 
threshold issue (thus allowing avoidance of merits rulings in cases involving “new” 
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opinion did not garner support.268  Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, framed in terms 
of the application of new rules to old judgments, carried the day and became the accepted 
foundation of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.269  This jurisprudence is simply not 
susceptible to being recast as a redressability jurisprudence,270 as the Danforth majority 
opinion attempts.  There is an undeniable analytical divide between Danforth and 
Teague. 
 
B. The key notes struck by the dissent 
 
The Danforth case presented an opportunity for the Court to arrogate an enormous power 
to itself.  A decision holding Teague binding on the states would have restricted the 
states’ opportunity to participate in the development of constitutional criminal procedure 
to the direct review track. Because the postconviction track is the first opportunity for 
litigants to raise certain constitutional claims271 – and the first opportunity for state courts 
to address those types of claims – exclusion of the states from doctrinal development in 
postconviction proceedings would have significantly expanded the territory under 
exclusive Supreme Court control.  Furthermore, because it would have been unlikely that 
federal postconviction courts would be held not bound by Teague if state postconviction 
courts were bound, a victory for the state of Minnesota in Danforth would have likely led 
to the lower federal courts being excluded from doctrinal development of postconviction 
claims as well.  The Supreme Court would then have been the only court in the country 
left with the power to develop constitutional criminal doctrine in those areas of law 
particularly susceptible to development in postconviction proceedings. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent indicates an awareness of this missed opportunity for 
consolidating doctrinal development in the Court.  Roberts identified the Court’s “role 
under the Constitution as the final arbiter of federal law, both as to its meaning and its 
reach” as one of the “fundamental issues at stake” in the case.272  Throughout, the Chief 
Justice pointedly refers only to the Supreme Court where he might have mentioned the 
federal courts collectively.  Teague did not emphasize the Supreme Court as the sole 
source of federal law – indeed Justice O’Connor later differentiated Teague from the 
choice-of-law rule embodied in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
                                                                                                                                                                     
rules), and was not apparently rooted in the Blackstonian model that lies at the heart of 
the Danforth opinion.  A Blackstonian would not have written that “[a]mong other things, 
until a rule is set forth, it would be extremely difficult to evaluate whether the rule is 
‘new’ at all” – because for a Blackstonian all rules are old.  Id. at 319 n.2. 
268 Only Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens’ concurrence. 
269 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992) (noting that Justice O’Connor’s analysis had 
been endorsed by a majority of the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh, 392 U.S. 302 (1989)). 
270 The Court’s recent description of the analysis in Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S.Ct. 1173 
(2007), is illustrative.  The availability of remedies or relief is simply not discussed. Id. at 
1180. 
271 See infra notes 321-335, and accompanying text. 
272 Danforth, supra, 128 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
Forthcoming in 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. __ (2009) 
  39 
(AEDPA)273 by noting that AEDPA, unlike Teague, “restricts the source of clearly 
established law to this Court's jurisprudence.”274  But imposing Teague on the states (and 
likely the lower federal courts), would have tended in that direction.  Chief Justice 
Roberts’ vision is that the rules of decision and the rules governing their applicability 
should come not from the federal courts generally, but specifically only from the 
Supreme Court.275 
Avoiding the wholesale consolidation of Supreme Court power over a vast portion of 
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine may prove to be the great victory of the 
Danforth decision.  But, as I discuss in depth below, whether the lower courts seize the 
opportunity of Danforth to participate in doctrinal development is entirely up to them.276 
Aside from the supremacy of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts saw the other “fundamental 
issue[] at stake” in Danforth as ensuring uniformity in the application of federal law.277  
The Teague approach, in its inception, stemmed from the concern that Linkletter 
permitted disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review.278 
Quoting Justice O’Connor, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized “the ‘fundamental 
principle’ of our Constitution” – that federal law “should be applied equally to all.”279  
The non-uniformity promoted by the majority’s decision, Chief Justice Roberts wrote,                                                         
273 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2007) provides: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings unless … the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” (emphasis added). See 
generally Shay & Lasch, supra note 17. 
274 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O’Connor, J., opinion for the Court). 
See also Bell v. Hill, 190 F.3d 1089, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding circuit precedent 
can be used to determine whether constitutional rule is “new” or “old”) (citing Gilmore v. 
Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993)); but see Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 598 (5th Cir. 
2002) (because state courts are not “compelled” to follow circuit precedent, Teague 
analysis must look only to Supreme Court precedent).  
275 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1048 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing the majority result “is 
contrary to the Supremacy Clause and the Framers’ decision to vest in ‘one supreme 
Court’ the responsibility and authority to ensure the uniformity of federal law”); id. at 
1053 (interest in uniformity “is the very interest that animates the Supremacy Clause and 
our role as the ‘one supreme Court’ charged with enforcing it”); id. at 1057 (“[W]hen the 
question is what federal rule of decision from this Court should apply to a particular case, 
no Court but this one – which has the ultimate authority ‘to say what the law is’ – should 
have final say over the answer.”) (citation omitted). 
276 See Section III-D, infra. 
277 Id. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
278 Id. at 1053 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 305, 316). 
279 Id. (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
1, 4 (1985)) (emphasis added). 
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allows federal constitutional law “to be applied differently in every one of the several 
states.”280  Similarly situated litigants might be treated entirely differently: “The same 
determination of a federal constitutional violation at the same stage in the criminal 
process can result in freedom in one State and loss of liberty or life in a neighboring 
State.”281 
 
Chief Justice Roberts noted a second non-uniformity promoted by the majority rule in 
Danforth, in addition to the non-uniform awarding or withholding of remedies – a non-
uniformity more closely related to the substantive content of the underlying constitutional 
rights than to the application of those rights.  Retroactivity determinations, wrote the 
Chief Justice, invariably depend on the “nature of the substantive federal rule at issue.”282  
The Linkletter test, for example, turns in part on the perceived purpose for the 
constitutional rule, while Teague’s “watershed” exception requires a determination of 
whether the constitutional rule serves a truth-seeking function “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”283  The majority’s ceding to the states the power to undertake their own 
retroactivity analysis, the Chief Justice proceeded, raises the possibility that state-court 
determinations of the “nature” of constitutional rules will be at odds with the Supreme 
Court’s determination – in violation of the Supremacy Clause.284 
 
The majority did not seriously engage the Chief Justice’s arguments on non-uniformity.  
Instead, the majority sidestepped the objection that “two criminal defendants … whose 
convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised an identical claim at 
the same time under the Federal Constitution” might not be similarly afforded relief.285 
The non-uniformity objected to by the Chief Justice, wrote the Court, “is a necessary 
consequence of a federalist system of government.”286                                                         
280 Id. at 1053-54. 
281 Id. at 1053. 
282 Id. at 1054. 
283 Id. (citing, inter alia, Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629; Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-15). 
284 Id. 
285 The majority focused on that description of the hypothetical defendants I have omitted 
at the ellipsis – “each of whom committed the same crime, at the same time” – dispensing 
with this by noting that “the two hypothetical criminal defendants did not actually 
commit the ‘same crime.’ They violated different state laws, were tried in and by 
different state sovereigns, and may – for many reasons – be subject to different 
penalties.” Id. at 1047.  The dissent rightly complained that the majority focused on an 
unimportant part of the hypothetical – “[D]isparate treatment under substantively 
different state laws is something we expect in our federal system; disparate treatment 
under the same Federal Constitution is quite a different matter.” Id. at 1053 n.2 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). 
286 Id. at 1047; see also id. at 1041 (noting that while there is a federal interest in 
“reducing the inequity of haphazard retroactivity standards and disuniformity in the 
application of federal law,” this interest yields to federalism and the inevitable acceptance 
that “States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their 
own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees.”). 
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Whether “necessary” or not, non-uniformity in the application of federal constitutional 
rules, and in the determination of the “nature” of such rules, appears to be a serious 
consequence of the Danforth decision.  Below, I will consider whether such non-
uniformity can be avoided after Danforth.287   
 
C. Important questions left open by Danforth 
 
The Danforth decision, naturally, leaves several questions remaining to be answered.  For 
example, the decision explicitly leaves unaddressed whether Congress can alter the rules 
of retroactivity by statute.288 
 
The decision also explicitly leaves open the question whether Teague, though not binding 
on state postconviction courts, might yet be binding on federal postconviction courts 
considering motions to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.289  I will answer that 
question in the negative below.290 
 
Also explicitly left open is whether states are required to give retroactive effect to rules 
that satisfy Teague’s “watershed” requirement.291  Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, finds 
in that explicit question a larger question implicitly left open – whether states are free to 
deny retroactivity when the Supreme Court has held retroactive application is mandated 
under Teague.292 This seems implausible, for three reasons. 
 
First, while the Danforth majority opinion does contain some sweeping statements that 
suggest the absolute independence of state collateral review from the Teague calculus,293 
there are strong suggestions that state courts are free only to consider Teague as a                                                         
287 See Section III-E, infra. 
288 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1034 n.4.  While the answer to this question is not within the 
scope of this Article, I would offer two observations.  First, the Danforth majority 
declares Teague to be exercise in statutory interpretation. Id. at 1039-40; see also 128 
S.Ct. at 1040 (“ … Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal 
courts applying a federal statute ….”).  Second, Congress already has altered the Teague 
rule.  See notes 273-274, supra, and accompanying text (discussing AEDPA’s restriction 
of the sources of “clearly established federal law” to Supreme Court precedent). 
289 Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1034 n.4. 
290 See Section IV, infra. 
291 Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1034 n.4. 
292 Id. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Lurking behind today’s decision is of course 
the question of just how free state courts are to define the retroactivity of our decisions 
…. I do not see any basis in the majority’s logic for concluding that States are free to 
hold our decisions retroactive when we have held they are not, but not free to hold that 
they are not when we have held they are.”). 
293 E.g. 128 S.Ct. at 1040 (“Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only 
to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding 
obligation on state courts.”). 
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baseline and offer broader remedial effect than Teague would.  Despite the focus on the 
states’ ability to offer broader remedies than Teague as a matter of state law,294 at the end 
of the day the majority holds that the availability or nonavailability of remedies is a 
“mixed question of state and federal law.”295  The majority recognizes that the uniformity 
concerns raised by Chief Justice Roberts in dissent implicate federal interests.296  
Although those federal interests are outweighed by the states’ interest in choosing to 
grant broader remedial effect to federal law,297 it is doubtful that the federal interest in 
uniformity would remain unoffended if a state or states were to grant less remedial effect 
to a federal constitutional rule than the federal courts – having taken comity into 
consideration – are required to grant on habeas review of the state courts.298 
 
Second, there are textual indications in the majority opinion that would support viewing 
Teague retroactivity as a constitutional “floor” below which the states may not fall.  
States should be free to develop state-law retroactivity rules, the majority writes, “in any 
fashion that does not offend federal law.”299  Additionally, the tolerance of disuniformity 
is not unlimited, but will be granted only “as long as [the states] do not infringe on 
federal constitutional guarantees.”300  Most directly, the majority opinion suggests                                                         
294 E.g. 128 S.Ct. at 1046 (“States that give broader retroactive effect to this Court’s new 
rules of criminal procedure do not do so by misconstruing the federal Teague standard. 
Rather, they have developed state law to govern retroactivity in state postconviction 
proceedings.”) (citation omitted). 
295 128 S.Ct. at 1047 (citing American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 296 U.S. at 205 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
296 Id. at 1041 (citing id. at 1053 (Robert, C.J., dissenting)). 
297 Id. at 1041.  It is significant, I believe, that the analogy the Danforth majority uses to 
emphasize the point is that of states offering broader personal rights under state law than 
required by the Federal Constitution. Id. (“Any State could surely have adopted the rule 
of evidence defined in Crawford under state law even if that case had never been decided.  
It should be equally free to give its citizens the benefit of our rule in any fashion that does 
not offend federal law.”).  On this analogy, “equally free” would not encompass the 
freedom to offer less remedial effect to federal law than required by Teague, just as states 
are not “equally free” to offer fewer personal rights than offered by the Federal 
Constitution. 
298 It might be argued that states ought to be permitted to offer less retroactivity than 
Teague requires because states are not required to offer any postconviction remedies. See 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) (citation omitted).   Yet, a state’s 
freedom to fashion procedures that are not constitutionally mandated is nonetheless 
subject to minimum constitutional guarantees of fairness. “[W]hen a State opts to act in a 
field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in 
accord with the dictates of the Constitution – and, in particular, in accord with the Due 
Process Clause.” Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985) (rejecting argument that 
defendant ought not to be entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel where 
appeal itself is not constitutionally mandated). 
299 128 S.Ct. at 1041. 
300 Id. 
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Teague is the constitutional floor in its approving cite of the Oregon Supreme Court’s 
opinion in State v. Fair301   – the Oregon Supreme Court “correctly stated,” wrote the 
majority, that it was free to fashion its own retroactivity rules “so long as [the state] 
give[s] federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme 
Court requires.”302 
 
Third, Supreme Court precedent cited by the dissent demonstrates the Court’s 
retroactivity decisions have been held to be binding on the states in postconviction 
proceedings.303 
 
A question perhaps more interesting than whether the states are constitutionally bound to 
provide at least as much retroactive effect as Teague does, is whether the constitutional 
floor might be higher than the baseline set by Teague.  It does, after all, seem odd that 
Teague – not a constitutional rule in and of itself, but rather an interpretation of the 
federal habeas statute dictated by considerations of comity and federalism – should set a 
constitutional baseline for the state courts.  Teague dials back retroactivity levels based 
on a calculus “tailored to the unique context of federal habeas”304 – but might it not 
offend the Constitution for state courts to dial back retroactivity as far, in the absence of 
the “unique context” and concerns underpinning Teague? 
 
The majority opinion suggests a negative answer to this question.  The majority states 
that Whorton v. Bockting305 “makes clear” that state courts are not required to give 
retroactive effect to the Crawford Confrontation Clause right on collateral review.306  
This is a mistake, however: Whorton only makes clear that federal courts are not required 
to give retroactive effect to Crawford on habeas corpus review of state-court 
judgments.307                                                         
301 263 Ore. 383, 502 P.2d 1150 (1972). 
302 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1039 (quoting State v. Fair, 263 Ore. At 387-88, 502 P.2d at 
1152). 
303 Id. at 1050 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]hen we found that a state court erred in 
holding that a particular right should not apply retroactively, the state court was bound to 
comply.”) (citing Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971) (per curiam) (reversing state 
court decision erroneously holding right to counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S.335 (1961) not retroactive); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (per curiam) 
(reversing state court decision finding denial of right to counsel under Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U.S. 128 (1967) but declining to give retroactive effect); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 
393 U.S. 5 (1968) (per curiam) (reversing state court decision holding White v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 59 (1963) not retroactive). 
304 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1039. 
305 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007). 
306 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1034. 
307 While the Court’s language in Whorton broadly referred to Crawford’s applicability in 
“a collateral proceeding” rather than “a federal habeas corpus proceeding,” 127 S.Ct. at 
1180, Whorton was in fact a federal habeas corpus proceeding, and its application of 
Teague was typical in that regard.  
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Chief Justice Roberts provides an example of state-court innovation that might 
demonstrate the existence of a constitutional baseline somewhere between Teague and 
Griffith for state (or federal) postconviction courts.  
 
[S]uppose we hold that the Sixth Amendment right to be represented by particular 
counsel of choice, recently announced in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 
140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), is a new rule that does not apply 
retroactively. Under the majority's rationale, a state court could decide that it 
nonetheless will apply Gonzalez-Lopez retroactively, but only if the defendant could 
prove prejudice, or some other criterion we had rejected as irrelevant in defining the 
substantive right. Under the majority's logic, that would not be a misapplication of 
our decision in Gonzalez-Lopez – which specifically rejected any required showing of 
prejudice, id., at 147-148, 126 S.Ct. 2557 – but simply a state decision on the scope of 
available remedies in state court.308 
 
The extent to which state postconviction proceedings (or federal postconviction 
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) create a “unique context” which might justify the 
withholding of remedies for a Federal constitutional violation is an open question.  
Because I argue below that state and federal courts should dispense with retroactivity 
analysis and give full remedial effect to “new” rules,309 I do not find it necessary to 
attempt to answer this question here. 
 
III. THE FUTURE OF RETROACTIVITY IN STATE 
POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 
 
Prior to Danforth, most states were applying Teague to determine whether federal 
constitutional rules would apply retroactively in state postconviction proceedings,310                                                         
308 Id. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
309 See Sections III and IV, infra. 
310 Shortly after Teague, Professor Hutton surveyed state approaches to retroactivity.  See 
Hutton, supra note 234 at 460-76.  She argued that Teague “is an inappropriate standard 
for states to adopt for their postconviction processes,” and urged states to “exercise their 
prerogative to develop their own rules and to adopt a position toward retroactivity which 
enables them to be an effective guarantor of their citizens' constitutional rights.” Id. at 
424-25. She reported that 8 of 12 states to consider the question after Teague chose to 
follow Teague.  Id. at 458 (table).  At present, it appears that 37 states now apply the 
Teague rule when considering claimed federal constitutional violations in state 
postconviction proceedings. Ex parte Harris, 947 So.2d 1139 (Ala. 2005); State v. 
Slemmer, 823 P.2d 41 (Ariz. 1991); People v. Bradbury, 68 P.3d 494, 498 (Colo. App. 
2002); Duperry v. Solnit, 803 A.2d 287, 317-19 (Conn. 2002); Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 
1121 (Del. 1991); State v. Gomes, 113 P.3d 184 (Hawai’i 2005); Porter v. State, 102 P.3d 
1099, 1102 (Idaho 2004); People v. Flowers, 561 N.E.2d 674 (Ill. 1990); Daniels v. State, 
561 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1990); Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77 (Iowa 1989); State v. 
Neer, 795 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1990); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 
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though many of those states did so out of convenience, recognizing that Teague was not 
binding upon the states.311  A small minority of states recognized they were not bound by 
Teague and applied a more relaxed retroactivity analysis, usually a version of the three-
factor Linkletter-Stovall test.312  Danforth’s declaration that the state courts are not bound 
by the Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence frees state courts to consider the 
question anew.313   
 
Among the various options from which state courts may choose, full retroactivity is far                                                                                                                                                                      
2005); State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292, 1296 (La. 1992); Commonwealth 
v. Bray, 553 N.E.2d  538 (Mass. 1990); State v. Adams, 171 Md. App. 668, 912 A.2d 16 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); Carmichael v. State, 927 A.2d 1172 (Me. 2007); State v. 
Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn. 2005); Manning v. State, 929 So. 2d 885, 898 
(Miss. 2006); State v. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 900 P.2d 260, 267 (Mont. 1995); State v. 
Reeves, 453 N.W.2d 359,383 (Neb. 1990); State v. Tallard, 149 N.H. 183, 816 A.2d 977, 
979-981 (N.H. 2003); State v. Purnell, 735 A.2d 513, 517, 520-24 (N.J. 1999); State v. 
Forbes, 119 P.3d 144, 146-47 (N.M. 2005); People v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265, 648 
N.E.2d 459, 464-465 (N.Y. 1995); State v. Zuniga, 336 N.C. 508, 512 (N.C. 1994); 
Greybull v. State, 2004 ND 116 (N.D. 2004); Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St. 3d 450, 751 
NE.2d 1043 (Ohio 2001); Thomas v. State, 888 P.2d 522, 527 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); 
Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or. 379, 84 P.3d 133 (Or. 2004); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 
Pa. 274, 865 A.2d 761, 780 (Pa. 2004); Palin v. Vose, 603 A.2d 738, 741-42 (R.I. 1992); 
Talley v. State, 640 S.E.2d 878, 880-81 (S.C. 2007); Johnson v. State, 797 S.W.2d 578, 
580 (Tenn. 1990); Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Mueller 
v. Murray, 252 Va. 356, 362, 478 S.E.2d 542 (Va. 1996); State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 
657, 677 (W. Va. 1995); State v. Lo, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756 (Wis. 2003). 
311 E.g., People v. Bradbury, 68 P.3d 494, 498 (Colo. App. 2002); State v. Mohler, 694 
N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ind. 1998); State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292, 1296 
(La. 1992); State v. Forbes, 119 P.3d 144, 146-47 (N.M. 2005). 
312 Smart v. State, 146 P.3d 15, 27 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (applying Linkletter); Johnson 
v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 407-09 (Fla. 2005) (applying Linkletter-like analysis); State v. 
Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo. 2003) (applying Linkletter); Colwell v. State, 59 
P.3d 463, 470 (Nev. 2002) (using Teague as “framework” but reserving ability to deviate 
from federal decisions regarding what constitutes “new” rule and whether new rule meets 
exceptions to rule of nonretroactivity); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514 (S.D. 1990) 
(applying Linkletter). 
313 Following Danforth, the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered supplemental briefing and 
held oral arguments on September 8, 2008.   The case remains pending.  At oral 
argument, Assistant State Public Defender Benjamin Butler argued for Stephen Danforth 
that Minnesota should apply the Linkletter-Stovall test in state postconviction 
proceedings.  Oral Argument, State v. Danforth (available at 
http://www.tpt.org/courts/MNJudicialBranchvideo_NEW.php?number=A04-1993(b)).  
Deputy Hennepin County Attorney Pat Diamond, representing the State of Minnesota, 
argued the Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt Teague as a matter of state law.  Id.  I 
owe thanks to Attorney Butler for providing me with copies of his supplemental briefing 
and directing me to the online oral argument video.  
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and away the best choice, offering fairness to litigants, a voice for state courts in the 
development of federal constitutional doctrine, and uniformity in the application of 
constitutional rules announced by the federal courts.  Concerns that retroactivity 
undermines finality are overstated.  Finally, retroactivity avoids the problems of 
administration that the Supreme Court’s attempts at non-retroactivity have engendered. 
 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to note the important differences between the 
functioning of intra-system postconviction proceedings and the inter-system federal 
habeas proceedings to which Teague applies. 
 
First, intra-system postconviction proceedings raise no comity concerns.  “Federalism 
and comity considerations are unique to federal habeas review of state convictions.”314 
This of course was one of the bases for the Court’s holding in Danforth that Teague does 
not bind the states.315  Because Teague was rooted in large part on considerations of 
comity, it is inappropriate to use Teague as a starting point on considering what 
retroactivity rules should apply in intra-system postconviction review.316  Judge 
Friendly’s view – that state postconviction proceedings offered “no occasion to be holier 
than the pope,”317 i.e. to afford greater retroactivity to new constitutional rules than 
offered in federal habeas proceedings – must be rejected, because Judge Friendly did not 
consider that the “pope” might have founded its rule on considerations irrelevant to the 
question.318  As will be shown, there is every reason for the state courts to be holier than 
the Supreme Court is in federal habeas proceedings when it comes to the question of 
retroactivity in state postconviction proceedings.319 
                                                         
314 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1031. 
315 Id. (”If anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to 
grant habeas relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague.”). 
316 Honorable Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to 
Grant Habeas Relief, 38 Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 421, 447-48 (2004); see also Giovanna 
Shay, State Courts May Choose Different Paths: Justices Offer Flexibility in Handling 
Habeas Cases, Ct. L. Trib. Vol. 34, No. 26  at 16 (June 30, 2008) (“State courts possess 
different interests than federal courts when reviewing state prisoners' convictions. As a 
result, state courts need not adopt wholesale the procedural rules used in federal habeas 
….”). 
317 Friendly, supra note 140, at 154. 
318 Judge Friendly, of course, wrote at a time when the Linkletter-Stovall standard was the 
prevailing retroactivity rule.  However, the Linkletter-Stovall standard, like the Teague 
standard, was founded primarily on considerations of comity.  See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 
637 (stating that to hold Mapp retroactive would not “add harmony to the delicate state-
federal relationship”). 
319 Stith, supra note 316, at 446 (“While merely adopting the federal test for retroactivity 
to cases on collateral review is certainly simpler and may ensure that the results in state 
habeas proceedings are consistent with the results that would be obtained on habeas 
review by the federal courts, this approach ignores the difference in function of state 
versus federal habeas review.”). 
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A second difference between intra-system collateral review and inter-system collateral 
review is that intra-system postconviction proceedings are a second round of litigation, 
whereas federal habeas proceedings are a third round.320  Intra-system postconviction 
proceedings therefore generally are closer in time to the trial or guilty plea and the events 
underlying the criminal charges.  This has a strong bearing on the finality calculus, which 
I discuss below. 
 
Third, and most importantly, state and federal postconviction proceedings have an 
important additional function lacking in federal habeas review – to provide an initial 
forum for the litigation of certain constitutional claims.  In federal habeas proceedings, 
every claim presented to the federal courts will typically have been previously presented 
to another court – indeed, exhaustion of available state-court remedies is a precondition 
for habeas relief.321  In intra-system postconviction proceedings there are significant 
exceptions, owing to the division of labor between trial and appellate courts.  Because 
appellate courts cannot find facts, claims that depend on evidence outside the record on 
appeal cannot be raised; state postconviction proceedings are usually initiated in a trial-
level court because the claims cognizable in postconviction proceedings are those that 
require evidence outside the record, and findings of fact by the court considering such 
evidence.322 
 
Thus, most states have a general bar against bringing claims in postconviction 
proceedings which could or should have been raised on direct review.323  Yet it is also                                                         
320 See Figure 1, supra. 
321 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see generally, Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, Chapter 
23.  There are, of course, exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, which may 
occasionally result in claims being presented for the first time on federal habeas review. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B) (relieving petitioner of exhaustion requirement where there is 
“an absence of available State corrective process” or circumstances make “such process 
ineffective to protect the rights” of the petitioner).  
322 E.g. State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St. 3d 98, 101 & n.1, 477 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 & n.1 (1985) 
(deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, but noting that because 
“it is possible that the issue of competency herein could not fairly have been determined 
without resort to evidence dehors the record” defendant would be entitled to relitigate the 
claim in postconviction proceedings); People v. Thomas, 38 Ill.2d 321, 323-24, 231 
N.E.2d 436, 437 (Ill. 1967) (to require issues to be presented on direct review when the 
evidentiary basis for the issues lies outside the record would frustrate purposes of state’s 
postconviction procedures); State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006) 
(ineffective assistance claim would be “more properly addressed” in postconviction 
proceedings where appellate record was inadequate to resolution of the claim). See also 
Opsahl v. State, 710 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Minn. 2006) (appellate court must defer to 
postconviction court’s credibility determinations); McElroy v. State, 864 N.E.2d 392, 
395-96 (Ind. App. 2007) (same); Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612, 623 (Fla. 2006) (same). 
323 E.g., Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 630 (Utah 2001); Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 
S.W.3d 619, 626 (Ky. 2000); Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989).  A 
similar procedural bar is applied in federal postconviction proceedings. See United States 
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recognized, as Judge Friendly pointed out, that those claims which are theoretically 
impossible – and those which are practically impossible – to raise during the direct 
review stages of litigation,324 are properly raised for the first time in postconviction 
proceedings.325   Among those claims not susceptible to litigation on direct review are the 
two types of claims most closely linked to serious error in capital cases326 – ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel327 and government suppression of exculpatory evidence (at 
least where the evidence continues to be suppressed throughout litigation on direct 
review).328  Other claims which typically rely on evidence “dehors the record”329 and are 
therefore not susceptible to presentation before collateral review include ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel;330 claims that trial or appellate counsel had a conflict of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-168, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); Bousley v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-622, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). 
324 Professors Hertz and Liebman discuss these claims in the context of arguing against 
Teague’s characterization of retroactivity as a threshold issue, Hertz & Liebman, supra 
note 18, § 25.4, at 969-70, and in arguing that in applying Teague to these claims on 
federal habeas review, the dividing line between presumptive retroactivity (under 
Griffith) and presumptive prospectivity (under Teague) should not be the conclusion of 
direct review, “because those claims cannot possibly arise, or at least usually do not arise 
– until after the direct appellate process has ended.” Id. § 25.6 at 1015-16. 
325 See supra notes 155-156, and accompanying text. 
326 James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition: 
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 Texas L. Rev. 1839, 1850 (2000). 
327 The Supreme Court, implementing the principle that “[r]ules of procedure should be 
designed to induce litigants to present their contentions to the right tribunal at the right 
time,” held that it in federal criminal cases, it is proper to raise ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claims for the first time on federal postconviction review pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003).  State courts have 
similarly held that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are best suited for 
postconviction review. See, e.g. Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 870, 872-73 
(Ky. 1998); Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind. 2001); State v. Howard, 751 
So. 2d 783, 802 (La. 1999); State v. Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn.2000); 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002). 
328 E.g. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (reaching merits of claim where factual 
predicate remained unavailable to habeas petitioner throughout state postconviction 
proceedings); Simon v. State, 857 So. 668, 679 (Miss. 2003); Buenoano v. State, 708 
So.2d 941, 947-48 (Fla. 1998) (permitting claim to be raised in successive postconviction 
motion where factual basis not previously available to defendant); State ex rel. Winn v. 
State, 685 So.2d 104 (La. 1996) (per curiam) (otherwise untimely claim allowed where 
factual basis not available to defendant earlier). 
329 Friendly, supra note 140, at 152. 
330 E.g. Timberlake, supra, 753 N.E.2d at 597; State v. Marshall, 269 Neb. 56, 690 
N.W.2d 593 (2005).  
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interest;331 claims of involuntary guilty pleas that were not knowing, intelligent, or 
voluntary;332 claims of juror misconduct;333 incompetence of the defendant;334 and the 
knowing use of false evidence by the prosecution.335   
 
A. The Court’s return to Blackstone 
 
As a preliminary matter, I note that one could argue that the Court’s embrace of the 
“declaratory” theory of law supports a return to retroactivity.  Chief Justice Roberts 
makes the point in his Danforth dissent.  That the Court does not create the law, but 
merely declares it, writes the Chief Justice, “may lead to the conclusion that 
nonretroactivity of our decisions is improper ….”336  Indeed, the Court’s initial move 
away from Blackstone in Linkletter was thought necessary to support prospectivity.337  
Logically, therefore, a return to Blackstone would suggest a return to retroactivity. 
 
I do not find this to be a particularly compelling case for retroactivity, however, for three 
reasons.  First, the Danforth majority finds no inconsistency between the Blackstonian 
view and prospectivity, and indeed recasts the Teague decision as consistent with the 
Blackstonian view (supplemented by the law of remedies).  State courts could similarly 
reconcile the declaratory view with prospectivity.  Second, the Supreme Court’s adoption 
of Blackstone or Austin is not binding on the states.  Some states currently apply the                                                         
331 E.g., Gibson v. Head, 282 Ga. 156, 158-59, 646 S.E.2d 257, 260 (Ga. 2007); People v. 
Harinarin, 33 A.D.3d 455, 456, 826 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (N.Y. App. 2006); People v. 
Powers, 260 Ill. App. 3d 163, 167, 631 N.E.2d 862, 866 (Ill. App. 1994). 
332 E.g. Trueblood v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1242, 1256 (Ind. 1999); Johnson v. State, 988 
So.2d 1069, 1072 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Jones v. State, 949 So.2d 872, 873-74 (Miss. 
App. 2007). 
333 E.g. Commonwealth v. Wood, 230 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Ky. App. 2007) (awarding 
postconviction relief based on juror misconduct not discovered until two years after trial); 
see also Ex parte Pierce, 851 So. 2d 606, 616 (Ala. 2000) (juror misconduct claim would 
be cognizable in postconviction proceedings if factual basis could not have been 
reasonably discovered in time for presentation on direct review). 
334 Jones v. State,  478 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 1985); Commonwealth v. Brown, 582 Pa. 
461, 485-86, 872 A.2d 1139, 1153 (2005). 
335 Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 1996) (holding defendant entitled to 
postconviction evidentiary hearing on claim that prosecution knowingly presented 
perjured testimony). 
336 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1056 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).   Chief Justice Roberts quickly 
dismisss the argument, noting “everyone agrees that full retroactivity is not required on 
collateral review.”  Id.  Why this is true is not immediately apparent.  Justices have 
argued that Stovall’s application of a single rule to direct review and collateral review 
was correct.  See infra note 349.  Assuming the Chief Justice is relying on Teague as 
establishing a sharp divide between direct review and collateral review, it is not entirely 
clear that Teague will survive Danforth in the long run.  See Section V, infra.  
337 See supra notes 59-65, and accompanying text. 
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Linkletter analysis in their postconviction proceedings,338 indicating a widespread 
acceptance of the Austinian model.  Nothing in Danforth requires those states to convert 
back to Blackstone’s declaratory model.  Third, and most importantly, the abandonment 
of Blackstone was justified.  As Professor Roosevelt has so eloquently put it: “The 
Blackstonian model, in its full metaphysical glory, is something of a legal unicorn. Its 
transcendently brooding common law does not exist now, and never really did, although 
there are still rare reported sightings and sideshow simulacra.”339 
 
Even Professor Mishkin defended the declaratory view not as an “accurate description of 
reality,”340 but as a “myth by which we live.”341  But that myth – that we live in a nation 
of laws, not men or women, that it is “the law” or “the Constitution” (and not the passing 
whim of a particular judge or judges) that produces the result in a given case342 – can be 
well served without adhering to Blackstone.  Thus, while explicitly disavowing 
Blackstone,343 Justice Harlan crafted a compelling case for retroactivity on direct review 
partly in terms of the equality that is at the heart of the myth of a nation of laws: “We 
depart from this basic judicial tradition when we simply pick and choose from among 
similarly situated defendants those who alone will receive the benefit of a ‘new’ rule of 
constitutional law.”344 
 
Thus, while the Court’s return to Blackstone should be of little concern for state courts 
reconsidering nonretroactivity, the principle of equality that underlies the Blackstonian 
“myth” provides a compelling reason for abandoning nonretroactivity in intra-system 
postconviction review.  
 
B. Prospectivity and the problem of equality 
 
In abandoning prospectivity in cases arising on direct review, the Court relied heavily on 
the equality principle outlined by Justice Harlan: “[S]elective application of new rules 
violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same.”345  Allowing one                                                         
338 See supra note 312. 
339 Roosevelt (1999), supra note 18, at 1083 (citing, inter alia, ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 40 (1997); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
85 (rev. ed. 1978)). 
340 Mishkin, supra note 49, at 59-60. 
341 Id. at 63. 
342 Id. at 62-63. 
343 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 677 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (“… I do not subscribe to the Blackstonian theory that the law should 
be taken to have always been what it is said to mean at a later time ….”); see also 
Pickelsimer, 375 U.S. at 4 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Surely no general answer [to the 
retroactivity question] is to be found in ‘the fiction that the law now announced has 
always been the law.’”) (citation omitted). 
344 Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
345 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323 (citing Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
Professors Fallon and Meltzer argue that “given the dim prospects for another Warren-
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litigant to be the “‘chance beneficiary’ of a new rule” while denying that benefit to others 
results in “actual inequity,” held the Court.346 
 
Teague, of course, implements a prospectivity regime.  Indeed, the plurality’s 
justification for making the retroactivity inquiry a threshold question was to avoid the 
“actual inequity” that necessarily accompanies selective prospectivity: “Retroactivity is 
properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant 
in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied 
retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”347 
 
Commentators have noted, however, that Teague did not eliminate the equality problem.  
While Teague avoids the most basic problem of selective prospectivity – “generating 
different answers for litigants in identical procedural postures”348 – it engenders 
inequality in a different way.  
 
Nonretroactivity approaches … create deeply unfair distinctions between defendants. 
All of these doctrines require selection of a trigger point – a way of separating those 
who will benefit from a new decision from those who will not – which will almost 
invariably make a claimant's eligibility for relief depend on something over which she 
had little, if any, control.349                                                                                                                                                                      
style expansion of defendants' rights in the age of the Rehnquist Court,” the liberal 
justices joined in Griffith because “[i]n their calculus, the value of ensuring equal 
treatment of similarly situated defendants therefore prevailed.”  Fallon & Meltzer, supra 
note 18, at 1745. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 387-88 & n.11 (1993) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (noting contraction of defendants’ procedural protections since 1985 and 
arguing that equality demands prosecution should also be bound by Teague). 
346 Id. (emphasis original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 
(1982)); see also Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18, at 1684 (“I am surprised that Stovall's 
“selective prospectivity” is not more widely considered an abomination. … The Court's 
explicit refusal to treat like cases alike [in Stovall] is perhaps the closest it has come to an 
open abdication of the judicial role.”). 
347 Teague, 489 U.S. at 300 (O’Connor, J.) 
348 Heytens, supra note 223, at 988. 
349 Id. at 987; see also id. at 990 (“Unless courts are prepared to grant full retrospective 
effect to all new decisions, a method must be created for dividing those who will benefit 
from those who will not. Every way of doing so creates distinctions that are subject to 
serious fairness objections; the only question is which method has the fewest 
shortcomings.”); Yin, supra note 18, at 288 (“Teague is also subject to the criticism that 
the availability (or lack thereof) of relief on collateral review is often dependent entirely 
on random factors over which criminal defendants have no control. … A criminal 
defendant has … no control over the exact date of finality ….”).  
The point was also made by Justice White, in his dissent in Griffith, which was joined 
by Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist: “[I]t seems to me that the attempt to 
distinguish between direct and collateral challenges for purposes of retroactivity is 
misguided. Under the majority's rule, otherwise identically situated defendants may be 
Forthcoming in 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. __ (2009) 
  52 
 
In the Court’s current retroactivity jurisprudence, the “trigger point” selected is finality – 
the conclusion of direct review.  Cases on direct review enjoy retroactive application of 
new rules under Griffith, while cases beyond direct review generally do not, under 
Teague.350  The selection of this “trigger point” is, arguably, informed by some 
appropriate considerations.  For example, if one agrees with Justice Harlan that the nature 
of judicial review requires retroactive application of new rules, then the end of direct 
review might appropriately “trigger” nonretroactivity.  Similarly, if one believes that 
finality is a factor that informs the choice between retroactive application and 
nonretroactive application, then arguably setting the “trigger” at the end of direct review 
is appropriate. 
 
But other considerations that ought to inform the selection of a “trigger point” are not 
taken into account.351  Most obviously, in the case of the postconviction claims discussed 
above, the selection of a “trigger point” before the claims may even be raised makes little 
sense.352  To accommodate this concern would require selection of different trigger points 
for different claims.353                                                                                                                                                                      
subject to different constitutional rules, depending on just how long ago now-
unconstitutional conduct occurred and how quickly cases proceed through the criminal 
justice system. The disparity is no different in kind from that which occurs when the 
benefit of a new constitutional rule is retroactively afforded to the defendant in whose 
case it is announced but to no others ….” Griffith, 479 U.S. at 331-32 (White, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added).  That this was expressed in a dissenting, rather than a 
concurring opinion in Griffith, is important, for it reflects the dissent’s belief that 
conversion to full retroactivity on direct review was misguided, and that retroactivity of 
new rules should be limited both on habeas and direct review. Id. at 332-33.  This view 
did not prevail, and in Justice plurality opinion in Teague, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist (but not Justice White, who continued to lament the demise of the Stovall-
Linkletter test, see Teague, 489 U.S. at 317 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment)), Justice O’Connor sacrificed the insistence on uniform retroactivity 
rules for both direct and habeas review, which would have required either overruling 
Griffith or extending it to habeas review, in favor of adopting a rule of general 
prospectivity in cases on habeas review.  
350 The Court does not appear to have applied Teague in cases reaching the Court on 
certiorari review from state postconviction proceedings.  E.g. Roper v. Simmons, 534 
U.S. 551 (2005) (holding Eight Amendment prohibits imposition of death penalty on 
juvenile offenders, abrogating prior precedent); Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) 
(awarding relief to litigant whose conviction became final in 1994 on basis of Supreme 
Court decisions issued in 2001 and 2004). 
351 See Roosevelt (1999), supra note 18, at 1108 (“[D]istinguishing between direct and 
collateral review requires more than an appeal to the value of finality and the danger of 
disruption.”). 
352 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 25.6 at 1015-16. 
353 Professor Yin suggests the procedural default doctrine peculiar to habeas corpus 
review can function as a superior substitute for the Teague retroactivity inquiry, in part 
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Additionally, accidents of timing will make a crucial difference where they ought not.  
For example, two litigants, one of whom is successful in obtaining discretionary review 
of a claim arguing for a new rule and one who is not, will obtain different outcomes 
despite raising the claim in identical postures.354  Or, more troubling, two codefendants 
convicted on the same day may be treated differently.  If one enjoys greater delay in the 
courts’ processing of his direct review applications, she will reap the benefit of 
retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure while her 
codefendant, whose direct review has already run, will not. 
 
The accidents of time created by the Teague “trigger point” were most dramatically 
criticized by four Justices dissenting in Schriro v. Summerlin.355  While Ring v. 
Arizona356 had the potential to invalidate the death sentences of 168 prisoners; in 
Summerlin, the Court cut off availability to Ring’s new rule for all but about sixty of 
them.357 Justice Breyer railed against the obvious inequity in treating similarly situated 
defendants differently: 
 
Is treatment “uniform” when two offenders each have been sentenced to death 
through the use of procedures that we now know violate the Constitution – but one is 
allowed to go to his death while the other receives a new, constitutionally proper 
sentencing proceeding? Outside the capital sentencing context, one might understand 
the nature of the difference that the word “finality” implies: One prisoner is already 
serving a final sentence, the other's has not yet begun. But a death sentence is 
different in that it seems to be, and it is, an entirely future event – an event not yet 
undergone by either prisoner. And in respect to that event, both prisoners are, in every 
important respect, in the same position. I understand there is a “finality-based” 
difference. But given the dramatically different nature of death, that difference 
diminishes in importance.358 
 
Part of Justice Breyer’s criticism of the result in Summerlin is based on the particular 
nature of the death penalty – and his view that the Teague “trigger point” would need to                                                                                                                                                                      
because “[u]nlike Teague, procedural default does not rest on the setting of arbitrary 
cutoff dates, and whether it occurs is generally in the control of the defendant and his or 
her counsel.” Yin, supra note 18, at 291.  In state postconviction proceedings, similarly, I 
would note that the general rule most states have adopted with respect to the cognizability 
of claims in postconviction proceedings – that a claim is not cognizable if it could or 
should have been raised on direct review, see supra note 323, and accompanying text – 
appears to be a suitable substitute for a “trigger point” shifting to prospectivity after 
direct review, which allows no room whatsoever for development of doctrine. 
354 Yin, supra note 18, at 283-84. 
355 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
356 536 U.S. 584 (2002), discussed supra at note 208 and accompanying text. 
357 Christopher M. Smith, Schriro v. Summerlin: A Fatal Accident of Timing, 54 DePaul 
L. Rev. 1325, 1325 (2005).  
358 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 363 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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be adjusted accordingly.  But at bottom, Justice Breyer’s concern is with the symbolism 
or myth associated with Blackstonian retroactivity – that we are a nation of laws, not 
lawmakers. “How can the Court square this spectacle,” wrote Justice Breyer, “with what 
it has called the ‘vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any 
decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason’?”359 
   
If the Ring decision promised a cure for the disease of being condemned to death, 
Summerlin was the hospital board’s decision to deny the cure to all patients except those 
recently diagnosed with the disease.  
 
Not only does the Teague “trigger point” create dissimilar treatment of litigants similarly 
situated in all relevant respects, it also creates perverse incentives for litigants to string 
out direct review litigation – which run counter to the finality concerns which supposedly 
inform the selection of the trigger.  Suppose two codefendants are convicted on the same 
day.  One does not appeal, while the other seeks direct review based on a frivolous claim.  
If a new rule is announced, which would benefit both, only the codefendant who initiated 
a frivolous appeal will be entitled to retroactive application.  The same hypothetical 
might involve one defendant convicted two years ago, who is still pursuing direct review, 
and a second defendant convicted forty-five days ago, who does not appeal.  The 
outcome – retroactive application of a new rule in the older case but not the newer – 
illustrates that finality is not always served by the Teague “trigger point.” 
 
Because Griffith commands the retroactive application of new rules on direct review, any 
employment of prospectivity in state postconviction proceedings will raise the difficulty 
of selecting a “trigger point” between Griffith retroactivity and prospectivity which will 
group together defendants who are similarly situated in respects relevant to the inquiry.  
This counsels for retroactive application of new rules in state postconviction proceedings. 
 
C. The nature of judicial review 
 
With respect to postconviction claims not ordinarily litigated on direct review, like 
ineffective assistance of counsel and government suppression of exculpatory evidence,360 
Justice Harlan’s argument for retroactivity of judicial decisions to cases pending on direct 
review, based on the nature of judicial review,361 is fully applicable to intra-system 
postconviction review. 
 
The heart of the matter is this.  With respect to postconviction claims, the postconviction 
track in both state and federal courts362 serves the same functions as the direct review 
track does with respect to all other claims.  There is an opportunity for presentation of the 
claim and factual development in a trial-level court, followed by one or more appeals and 
the possibility of certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court.  Although the                                                         
359 Id. (citation omitted). 
360 See supra notes 321-335, and accompanying text.  
361 See supra notes 113, 121-127, and accompanying text. 
362 See Figures 1 and 2, supra. 
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criminal defendant, or the criminal case, is seen as being in stages 5 through 8 of the 
lifespan of the case (4 through 6 in federal cases), the postconviction claims are 
effectively in stages 1 through 4 (or 1 through 3 in federal cases).363 
 
Because the postconviction claims are, during the postconviction track, effectively on 
direct review, Justice Harlan’s logic applies, and there is no meaningful way to 
distinguish Griffith retroactivity on direct review. 
 
D. A voice for state courts in the development of federal constitutional 
criminal procedure 
 
State courts already enjoy an important role in the development of constitutional criminal 
doctrine in cases on direct review.  As Professor Shay and I have noted elsewhere, 
empirical analysis suggests the “codification” of Teague in AEDPA364 – and its 
elimination of federal habeas review as a locus for doctrinal development – has resulted 
in, and will continue to result in, the Supreme Court using state-court criminal cases on 
the direct review track as a vehicle for announcing new rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure.365   
 
Logic suggests that state postconviction proceedings will be of similar importance to 
doctrinal development after Teague and AEDPA – particularly with respect to 
postconviction claims not ordinarily litigated on direct review.366  Just as Teague and 
AEDPA eliminated the federal-state court “dialogue” with respect to direct review 
claims, requiring the initiation of a new constitutional dialogue that will “increasingly 
feature conversations among state courts,”367 the elimination of federal habeas review as 
a focal point for dialectical federalism with respect to postconviction claims demands a 
similar response.  State and federal postconviction proceedings present the only 
opportunities for the lower courts to participate in development of doctrine with respect 
to postconviction claims.  Adopting Teague prospectivity would leave doctrinal 
development in these areas exclusively in the hands of the Supreme Court, unguided by 
lower court approaches.368 
 
In order to preserve opportunities for courts – and incentives for litigants – to engage in 
doctrinal development, state courts must adopt either full retroactivity or selective                                                         
363 Id. 
364 AEDPA did not codify Teague precisely, and indeed is even more stifling of doctrinal 
development than Teague.  See supra note 274; see also Shay & Lasch, supra note 17, at 
232-33 & nn. 62-64, 232 n. 126; Chen, supra note 230, at 588-93. 
365 Shay & Lasch, supra note 17, at 240-46; see also Chen, supra note 230, at 629-31, 
634 (discussing AEDPA’s “subversive impact on the exposition of criminal procedure 
law”). 
366 See supra notes 321-335, and accompanying text.  
367 Shay & Lasch, supra note 17, at 265 
368 Cf. Blume, supra note 18, at 584 (quoted in note 236, supra). 
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prospectivity.369  With its inequality problem,370 selective prospectivity is a singularly 
unattractive choice. 
 
State courts have a particular interest in contributing to the development of federal 
constitutional criminal procedure,371 for two reasons.  First, state courts are subject to the 
Federal Constitution because it describes the constitutional “floor” below which the states 
may not go in offering procedural protections.372  Second, while states are permitted to go 
above this constitutional “floor” and offer greater procedural protections than the Federal 
Constitution requires,373 state courts have not heeded calls to action.374  Instead, state 
courts have persistently engaged in “lockstep interpretation,” construing state 
constitutional provisions as offering procedural protections that are merely coextensive 
with the Federal Constitution.375   
 
Had the State of Minnesota prevailed in Danforth, states would have been 
disenfranchised from influencing federal constitutional doctrine, and might have been 
forced to reconsider whether state constitutional provisions ought to be coextensive with 
their federal counterparts.  Indeed the majority and dissent in Danforth engaged in battle 
over precisely this point.  Chief Justice Roberts would have held that while states are free                                                         
369 See Stovall, 383 U.S. at 301 (using selective prospectivity to preserve the “incentive of 
counsel to advance contentions requiring a change in the law”) (citing Mishkin, supra 
note 49, at 60-61); see also supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
370 See Section I-D, supra. 
371 The amicus briefs filed by some states in Danforth suggest the recognition of a state 
interest in participating in the development of federal criminal law may be far from 
universal. Eleven states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico urged the Court to hold 
Teague binding on the states. 2007 WL 2428382 (Brief Amicus Curiae of the States of 
Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in Support of 
Respondent). Eight other states urged the Court to hold Teague not binding, but did so by 
way of argument that states have the power to abolish postconviction review altogether, 
and therefore have the right to fashion whatever retroactivity rules they choose – whether 
less or more restrictive than Teague. 2007 WL 2088650 at *7 - *10 (Brief of Kansas and 
the Amici States in Support of Neither Party). 
372 Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). 
373 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983). 
374 E.g. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 495-98 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights 
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 547-48 (1986). See also Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and 
Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 
656, 692 & n.225 (2000) (citing Justice Brennan’s articles and other authorities). 
375 Schapiro, supra note 374, at 692-93 (and authorities cited therein); Robert F. 
Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-By-Case 
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping? 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1499, 1502 & n.11 
(2003) (state courts engage in “lockstep interpretation” in “the clear majority of cases”). 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to extend greater protection under their own laws, the retroactivity of federal law is a 
question of federal law.376 On this view, if a state court wished to apply Ring or Crawford 
retroactively in state postconviction proceedings, for example, it would have to do so by 
announcing a state-law protection analogous to Ring or Crawford in every respect but its 
retroactivity on collateral review. 
 
The Danforth majority, however, does not seek to force state courts to go their own way. 
“Any State could surely have adopted the rule of evidence defined in Crawford under 
state law even if that case had never been decided.  It should be equally free to give its 
citizens the benefit of our rule in any fashion that does not offend federal law.”377  While 
the second statement neither necessarily follows from the first, nor meets the dissent’s 
objections, finding the retroactivity question to be a state-law question allows the 
majority to keep the states invested in the development of the Federal Constitution. 
 
Preserving state postconviction proceedings as a locus for constitutional doctrinal 
development would allow state courts to influence the development of important 
doctrines such as those concerning ineffective assistance of counsel and the government’s 
suppression of material exculpatory evidence.  Retroactive application of new rules in 
state postconviction proceedings preserves litigants’ incentives to raise novel arguments 
and allows state courts to protect their stake these doctrines, and avoid a schism between 
state and federal constitutions. 
 
E. Retroactive application of new rules in state postconviction 
proceedings ensures uniformity 
 
Retroactive application of new rules in state postconviction proceedings would also 
circumvent what will otherwise be a significant detriment flowing from the Danforth 
decision – non-uniformity in application of federal constitutional rules.  Just as 
employing a “trigger point” to separate cases that will receive the retroactive benefit of 
new rules from those that will not creates an equality problem, so also does Danforth’s 
allotment to the states of the power to fashion their own retroactivity rules in 
postconviction proceedings.   
 
Chief Justice Roberts posed the following hypothetical:  
 
Of two criminal defendants, each of whom committed the same crime, at the same 
time, whose convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised an 
identical claim at the same time under the Federal Constitution, one may be executed 
while the other is set free – the first despite being correct on his claim, and the second                                                         
376 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1057 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 1053 (“A State 
alone may ‘evaluate, and weight the importance of’ finality interests when it decides 
which substantive rules of criminal procedure state law affords; it is quite a leap to hold, 
as the Court does, that they alone can do so in the name of the Federal Constitution.”) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis original). 
377 Id. at 1041. 
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because of it.  That result is contrary to the Supremacy Clause and the Framers' 
decision to vest in “one supreme Court” the responsibility and authority to ensure the 
uniformity of federal law.378 
 
This hypothetical problem was actualized, even before Danforth was announced, in state-
court decisions considering the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona.379  Some state 
courts considered themselves bound by Teague;380 others did not.381  In each camp the 
results were mixed.  Of those courts following Teague, some held Ring prospective,382 
while one court held itself bound by Teague but in essence afforded retroactive 
application to Ring under state law.383  Among state courts declaring independence from 
Teague, results varied as well.  Florida, applying a state-law retroactivity test akin to 
Linkletter, held the Ring rule would not be applied retroactively in state postconviction 
proceedings.384 Missouri, by contrast, adopted the Linkletter-Stovall test for 
postconviction proceedings, and declared Ring retroactive.385  Thus, while postconviction 
litigants in Florida and Idaho were not granted the benefit of Ring retroactively, those in 
Missouri and Indiana were.  The inequality identified by the Danforth and Summerlin 
dissents is real, not hypothetical. 
 
The majority’s answer in Danforth – that “such nonuniformity is a necessary 
consequence of a federalist system of government”386 – is no answer at all.  It is one thing 
to believe that state courts can serve as laboratories of experimentation387 and thereby                                                         
378 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1047-48 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
379 536 U.S. 584 (2002), discussed supra at note 208 and accompanying text. 
380 E.g. Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 785, 102 P.3d 1099, 1104 (Idaho 2004) (citing 
Summerlin); Saylor v. Indiana, 808 N.E.2d 646, 648-49 (Ind. 2004). 
381 E.g. Evans v. State, 975 So. 2d 1035, 1052 (Fla. 2007) (applying state-law 
retroactivity test akin to Linkletter, see Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980));  
Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 819, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002); State v. Whitfield, 107 
S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003). 
382 E.g. Porter, supra note 380. 
383 Saylor, supra note 380. The Saylor court noted that certiorari had been granted by the 
Supreme Court in Summerlin, yet declined to await a ruling, instead exercising its power 
under the Indiana Constitution to revise a criminal sentence. 808 N.E.2d at 649-50.  The 
court held: “[W]e conclude it is not appropriate to carry out a death sentence that was the 
product of a procedure that has since been revised in an important aspect that renders the 
defendant ineligible for the death penalty.” Id. at 650-51. 
384 E.g. Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 (Fla. 2005) (applying state-law retroactivity 
test akin to Linkletter, see Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980)). Nevada, applying a 
state-law test akin to Teague, likewise held Ring not retroactive. Colwell, 118 Nev. at 
819-22, 59 P.3d at 472-73. 
385 State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003). 
386 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1047. 
387 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, 
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participate in a dialogue which contributes to the Supreme Court’s reasoned development 
of constitutional criminal doctrine.388  But this is quite different from experimentation 
with respect to the retroactive application of a clear new rule announced by the Supreme 
Court, where it results in the kind of non-uniformity seen in the decisions applying Ring. 
 
Freeing the state courts from Teague not only permits the unequal treatment of 
postconviction petitioners from one state to the next, it also raises a second non-
uniformity concern – the possibility of eroding the clarity of federal law.  This argument 
is raised by the Danforth dissenters.  Because retroactivity rules like those announced in 
Linkletter and Teague involve an examination of the “nature of the substantive federal 
rule at issue,”389 even state courts adopting the same retroactivity test may arrive at 
different results by virtue of different opinions as to the nature of the underlying 
constitutional rule. 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court, for example, concluded that the Ring rule does not seriously 
diminish the likelihood of an “accurate” death sentence.  Similarly, the Florida Supreme 
Court (deferring to the Supreme Court’s characterization of the purpose of Ring in 
Summerlin) found the purpose of the Ring rule was not to promote accuracy.  But another 
state court might conclude, as did four Justices of the United States Supreme Court,390 
that the rule does promote a form of “accurate” resolution.  Should such a split occur, it 
would be debatable whether the Ring rule applied in different jurisdictions would remain 
substantively the same. 
 
Chief Justice Roberts’ view, that such divergent application of a clear rule like Ring 
produces intolerable inequities and threatens to undermine the supremacy of federal 
law,391 is compelling.  His argument that uniformity ought to be ensured by holding 
Teague binding on the states, however, is part and parcel of his view that the 
responsibility for constitutional development should reside almost exclusively in the 
Supreme Court,392 and was rightly rejected.  Such a structure would ensure uniformity 
not only by having the Supreme Court “say what the law is,” but also whether or not the 
law is to be applied retroactively.   
 
This top-down view of doctrinal development can be rejected, however, without rejecting 
uniformity.  A rule of retroactivity in state postconviction proceedings simultaneously 
preserves a state’s power to develop federal constitutional doctrine, while supporting – if                                                                                                                                                                      
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
388 See supra notes 226-228, and accompanying text; see Hutton, supra note 234, at 446-
47. 
389 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1054 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
390 See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text. 
391 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing uniformity in 
application of federal law “is the very interest that animates the Supremacy Clause and 
our role as the ‘one supreme Court’ charged with enforcing it”). 
392 See supra notes 272-275 and accompanying text. 
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universally applied by all states393 – the supremacy of that doctrine by ensuring its 
uniform application nationwide.  why should state courts be concerned?  Uniformity, 
suggests Chief Justice Roberts, is “quite plainly a predominantly federal interest.”394  My 
only answer to this is that the very interest I have already noted the states have in 
developing federal constitutional doctrine, implies an equal interest in the healthy 
maintenance of that body of law.   
 
Retroactivity in postconviction proceedings should therefore be the preferred approach.. 
 
F. Finality, the only Teague concern that remains 
 
While the comity concern discussed in Teague is not an issue when considering state 
postconviction proceedings, “there was more to Teague than that.”395 Even after 
Danforth, the finality concern is alive and kicking: “It is a matter that states should be 
free to evaluate, and weigh the importance of, when prisoners held in state custody are 
seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by their lower courts.”396  There is good 
reason, however, to believe that finality concerns are not an impediment to retroactive 
application of new rules in state postconviction proceedings.  Finality concerns in state 
postconviction actions are not as weighty as in habeas review, are outweighed by 
competing considerations, and are already adequately addressed through other procedural 
mechanisms. 
 
1. The value of “finality” in state postconviction proceedings 
 
Assuming, for the moment, the validity of the finality concerns of Professor Bator and                                                         
393 Here I advert to the Kantian “categorical imperative.”  A state, in choosing its 
retroactivity rules, should adhere to the rule: “I should never act except in such a way that 
I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” IMMANUEL KANT, 
GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14 (James W. Ellington trans., 3d ed. 
1993), quoted in Donald L. Beschle, Kant's Categorical Imperative: An Unspoken Factor 
in Constitutional Rights Balancing, 31 Pepperdine L. Rev. 949, 965 (2004).  Because I 
believe the concern that a diversity of retroactivity schemes (or universal adoption of a 
retroactivity rule which requires inquiry into the “nature of the substantive federal rule at 
issue” which may produce a diversity of results across jurisdictions) will engender non-
uniformity is a serious concern, I do not share the view that state courts should accept the 
Court’s invitation to “fashion rules which respond to the unique concerns of that state.” 
Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1042 (quoting Hutton, supra note 234, at 422-23); see also Stith, 
supra note 316, at 449 (“Other states [than Missouri], in light of their own concerns and 
jurisprudence, may more narrowly interpret the right to habeas review under state law.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 
395 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1052 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  The Danforth majority was 
correct to understand Teague as primarily concerned with comity, given its historical and 
theoretical underpinnings. See Section I, supra. 
396 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1041. 
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Judge Friendly which proved so influential in shaping the Court’s retroactivity 
jurisprudence, it is a relatively simple matter to demonstrate the weakened force of those 
concerns in state postconviction proceedings.  This is true by virtue of the intra-system 
nature of state postconviction review, and because state postconviction review generally 
occurs earlier in time than federal habeas review.397 
 
The intra-system quality of state postconviction review substantially lessens the resource 
problems occasioned by collateral attack.398  Most importantly, the postconviction judge 
and the prosecutor defending the postconviction action will be familiar with the state law 
applicable to the case, and quite likely the facts as well, as state postconviction 
proceedings are often brought before the same trial court that imposed judgment.399  
Intra-system postconviction proceedings “bear[] the markings of an integral part of a 
continuous criminal proceeding that is segmented by no event or condition decisive of 
finality.”400 
 
Furthermore, intra-system postconviction proceedings occur earlier in time than federal 
habeas review.401  This reduces Judge Friendly’s concern that accurate factfinding would 
not be possible in collateral proceedings and on retrial, as his concern increases in direct 
proportion to the amount of time that elapses between conviction and subsequent 
litigation events.402 
 
Professor Bator and Judge Friendly also argued that opportunities for collateral attack 
corrode the criminal law’s deterrent and rehabilitative functions.403  I believe those 
concerns are overstated.  Professor Amsterdam, whose article discussing finality was 
relied upon by Judge Friendly,404 shared the concerns enumerated by Judge Friendly as to 
resources and the diminished accuracy of factfinding,405 but was more “tentative” than                                                         
397 See Figure 1, supra. 
398 Hutton, supra note 234, at 443-44 (“It is less complicated to garner the resources to 
respond to a postconviction proceeding within the system which originally handled the  
case, particularly if the case has recently been finalized.”). 
399 E.g. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15; Fla. R. Crim. P. Rule 3.850; Mont. Code 
Ann. § 46-21-101(1); Indiana Postconviction Rule PC 1. 
400 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 25.6, at 1014 (discussing federal postconviction 
actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). 
401 It is of course possible for state prisoners to bypass the state postconviction track and 
proceed directly to federal habeas review, but they do so at the cost of forfeiting any 
claims not exhausted on direct review.  See generally Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 
5.1a, at 216. 
402 Friendly, supra note 140, at 146-47. See also Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 325 
(1996) (second and successive habeas petitions “pose a greater threat to the State's 
interests in ‘finality’” than first habeas petition). 
403 See supra notes 34-35, 146, and accompanying text. 
404 Friendly, supra note 140, at 146 & n.15, 161 (citing Amsterdam, supra note 140).  
405 Amsterdam, supra note 140, at 383-84 (identifying as “aspects of a ‘finality’ factor”: 
“(a) duplication of judicial effort; (b) delay in setting the criminal proceeding at rest; (c) 
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Professor Bator in embracing the claim that collateral attack undermines deterrence and 
rehabilitation. “[W]e know virtually nothing about the actual operation of the deterrent 
and rehabilitative principles,” Amsterdam wrote, though he was willing to adopt the 
“working assumption that long-protracted adversary litigation of an issue in the nature of 
a plea in bar hardly furthers the deterrent or rehabilitative efficacy of the law.”406 
 
I believe the claims of Professor Bator and Judge Friendly as to deterrence and 
rehabilitation – claims that have been repeated, without empirical analysis, by the 
Court407 – are, in Professor Bator’s words, simply “not proven.”408  Indeed I find them 
implausible, and take issue even with Professor Amsterdam’s “tentative” conclusion that 
the availability of collateral attack “hardly furthers” deterrence or rehabilitation.409  
Unless there is evidentiary support for an actual weakening of deterrence or 
rehabilitation, I propose that the availability of collateral attack for the correction of error, 
because it serves to ensure the accuracy of convictions, also serves deterrence or 
rehabilitation.410 
 
Bator’s claim is that a “procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry 
into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence 
about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of the 
underlying substantive commands.”411  Given that we live in an age in which the effect of 
the death penalty as a deterrent to crime is hotly debated,412 it seems at a minimum naïve                                                                                                                                                                      
inconvenience and possibly danger in transporting a prisoner to the sentencing court for 
hearing; (d) postponed litigation of fact, hence litigation which will often be less reliable 
in reproducing the facts (i) respecting the postconviction claim itself, and (ii) respecting 
the issue of guilt if the collateral attack succeeds in a form which allows retrial (the 
burden of proof of guilt on retrial, of course, remaining with the prosecutor).”). 
406 Amsterdam, supra note 140, at 387 & n.41. 
407 See supra note 36. 
408 Professor Bator declared this the “proper verdict” on the wisdom of Brown v. Allen. 
Bator, supra note 25, at 525, 
409 Amsterdam, supra note 140, at 387 & n.41. 
410 See generally, Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 
35 Conn. L. Rev. 1321 (2003) (arguing that conviction of the innocent decreases 
deterrence); see also Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural 
Boundaries, 94 Va. L. Rev. 79 (2008) (“The realization of the goals of both criminal and 
civil litigation is contingent upon accurate fact-finding by the court. … From the criminal 
perspective, convicting innocent defendants impairs the social goals of deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”). 
411 Bator, supra note 25, at 452. 
412 See generally, John J. Donohue III & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical 
Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 Stanford L. Rev. 791 (2005).  Professors 
Donohue and Wolfers conclude: “The U.S. data simply do not speak clearly about 
whether the death penalty has a deterrent or antideterrent effect. … As to whether 
executions raise or lower the homicide rate, we remain profoundly uncertain.” Id. at 843 
(citation omitted). 
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to accept on faith the idea that the availability of collateral attack weakens deterrence.  
And, as a matter of commonsense, I would suggest that the hypothesis – that would-be 
criminals would decide to engage in prohibited behavior even in part because of the 
theoretical possibility of postconviction relief after a number of years of incarceration413 
– seems far-fetched. 
 
Judge Friendly deftly changes the subject to rehabilitation at this point, indicating the 
weakness of the argument as to deterrence: “It is not an answer that a convicted 
defendant generally remains in prison while collateral attack is pending,” he writes. 
“Unbounded willingness to entertain attacks on convictions must interfere with at least 
one aim of punishment – ‘a realization by the convict that he is justly subject to sanction, 
that he stands in need of rehabilitation.’”414  
 
There are two answers to the suggestion that the availability of collateral attack 
undermines rehabilitation.  First, rehabilitation is no longer a principal goal of our 
criminal justice system.415  Judge Friendly acknowledges this as a “serious problem, 
demanding our best thought,” but dismisses the argument as “irrelevant.”416  Why it is 
irrelevant is hard to fathom – that collateral attack should be truncated for its purported 
harm to a rehabilitative ideal no longer meaningfully served by any other aspect of our 
criminal system seems difficult to justify. 
 
Second, the argument that collateral attack undermines rehabilitation is equally 
applicable to direct review.  On Bator’s theory, the rehabilitation of a prisoner cannot 
begin “if society itself continuously tells the convict that he may not be justly subject to 
reeducation and treatment in the first place.”417  On this view, the delays in exhausting 
direct review are such that many prisoners would be released due to the expiration of                                                         
413 Yin, supra note 18, at 238 & n.265 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure 
As a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289 (1983)). 
414 Friendly, supra note 140, at 146 (quoting Bator, supra note 25, at 452). 
415 See Austin Sarat, Memorializing Miscarriages of Justice: Clemency Petitions in the 
Killing State, 42 Law & Society Rev. 183, 187 (2008) (noting the “rejection of 
rehabilitation as the guiding philosophy of criminal sentencing and … the increasing 
politicization of issues of crime and punishment since the 1960s.”); Austin Sarat, Putting 
a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Victims, Retribution, and George Ryan's Clemency, 82 N. 
Carolina L. Rev. 1345, 1350 (2004) (“Just deserts, not deterrence or rehabilitation, 
becomes the primary, if not the sole, norm governing punishment.”). In contrast, one note 
suggests the rise of “problem-solving courts” reflects a return to the rehabilitative ideal. 
Developments in the Law – The Law of Mentall Illness: Mental Health Courts and the 
Trend Toward a Rehabilitative Justice System, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1168, 1174-76 (2008). 
Such courts have little to do with the argument at hand, however, because they present an 
alternative to the structured criminal justice system of trials, appeals, and collateral 
review that is the concern of this Article. 
416 Friendly, supra note 140, at 146. 
417 Bator, supra note 25, at 452. 
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their sentences, before rehabilitation could begin.418  Bator recognizes his argument 
sweeps too broadly, and justifies this sacrifice of the rehabilitative ideal as outweighed by 
the benefit of direct review.419  As is discussed in the next section, Bator’s argument is 
equally applicable to collateral review, where there are significant benefits which 
outweigh any of the finality concerns identified by Bator and Friendly. 
 
2. Benefits of retroactivity on collateral review outweigh finality 
concerns 
 
Both Professor Bator and Judge Friendly recognized that their concerns with finality 
would give way to the extent that direct review fails to provide a forum for 
postconviction claims such as ineffective assistance of counsel and government 
suppression of material exculpatory evidence.420 
 
Professor Bator, concerned with the “process” model of reliability, crafted a significant 
exception to his general view that habeas review was superfluous, for occasions where                                                         
418 See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Green v. Washington, et al., 917 F.Supp. 1238, 1272 (N.D. Ill. 
1996) (noting, in class action brought by state prisoners, that delays in processing of 
appeals were such that “approximately 45% of the members of petitioner class will likely 
have served all of their sentences even before a decision is rendered in their appeals”). A 
cursory survey of average lengths of incarceration compared to average processing time 
for the initial appeal suggests the time it takes to complete the three appellate stages of 
the direct review track (appeal as of right, discretionary review, and certiorari review, see 
Figure 1) may often be as long or longer than a prisoner’s sentence. Compare People v. 
Rios, 43 P.3d 726 (Colo. App. 2001) (13-month time for filing of transcripts and 2-year 
time to resolve initial appeal as of right not “inordinate delay”) with Colorado Legislative 
Council, “An Overview of the Colorado Adult Criminal Justice System: Report to the 
General Assembly,” Research Publication No. 487 (January 2001) (available online at  
http://www.law.du.edu/images/uploads/library/CLC/487a.pdf) at 61 (average length of 
incarceration for Colorado in FY 98-99 was 49 months); compare State Court 
Administrative Office, Judicial Resources Recommendations (August 2007) (available 
online at 
http://courts.michigan.gov/scao/resources/publications/reports/JRRSummary2007.pdf) at 
53-54 (noting average time from filing of appeal in Michigan Court of Appeals to 
decision was 653 days in 2001 and 423 days in 2006) with Citizens’ Research Council of 
Michigan, Corrections Growth: A Long-Term Analysis of Growth in Michigan’s 
Department of Corrections (May 2, 2008) (available online at 
www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2000s/ 2008/Corrections_Presentation_05-02-2008.ppt) at 
11 (average length of incarceration for Michigan during same time period around 45 
months). 
419 Bator, supra note 25, at 453.  For Bator, that benefit is that intra-system appellate 
review “provides authoritative and uniform pronouncements on the law of that 
jurisdiction” while certiorari review “provides the state courts with authoritative and 
uniform pronouncements of federal law.” Id. 
420 See supra notes 321-335, and accompanying text. 
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direct review afforded no corrective process for claims of constitutional error.421  
Examples offered by Bator included claims of judicial bias (not discovered until after 
direct review), mob domination of the court and jury (with no remedy available on direct 
review), and coerced guilty pleas.422 Similarly, Judge Friendly recognized the 
appropriateness of state postconviction proceedings to address constitutional claims not 
open to consideration on direct review, such as coerced pleas, the use of perjured 
testimony by the prosecution, or the incompetence of the defendant to stand trial. 423 
 
Not only did Bator and Friendly concede that providing a forum for litigating such claims 
outweighs the finality concerns they outlined, they also recognized that providing such a 
forum might be constitutionally required.  Thus, while Bator argues against federal 
habeas review of such questions, he can do so only by placing the burden of such 
litigation on the state courts:  “[T]he state itself must provide a postconviction forum for 
the canvassing of these questions, and … the refusal of a state to do so is simply ‘error’ 
subject to reversal by the Supreme Court.”424  Judge Friendly similarly noted the 
possibility that “there are circumstances, such as post-trial discovery of the knowing use 
of material perjured evidence by the prosecutor or claims of coercion to plead guilty, 
where failure to provide [postconviction process] would deny due process of law.”425 
 
Just as finality is not a strong enough interest to overcome the need for retroactive 
application of new rules on direct review,426 so too to the extent state postconviction 
proceedings serve as a first round of litigation for certain types of claims, finality must 
fail as a justification for nonretroactivity. 
 
3. Addressing finality through procedural mechanisms 
other than nonretroactivity 
 
Finality is sufficiently addressed through procedural mechanisms other than 
nonretroactivity.  Statutes of limitation and procedural default doctrine are two examples.  
I wish to emphasize that I am in no way endorsing the use of these restrictions on 
postconviction relief; well-founded criticism of these doctrines abounds.427  Nevertheless,                                                         
421 Bator, supra note 25, at 455-60. 
422 Id. at 456. 
423 Friendly, supra note 140, at 152. 
424 Id. at 459-60. 
425 Friendly, supra note 140, at 168. 
426 See supra notes 417-419 and accompanying text. 
427 The one-year statute of limitations imposed by AEDPA on federal habeas petitions, 
for example, has been declared “an unmitigated disaster.” Peter Sessions, Swift Justice?: 
Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions of State 
Prisoners, 70 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1513, 1567 (1997); see also id. at 1555-67 (examining 
practical difficulties occasioned by a statute of limitations); Christopher Flood, Closing 
the Circle: Case v. Nebraska and the Future of Habeas Reform, 27 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & 
Soc’l Change 633, 658 (2001-02) (arguing state postconviction statutes of limitations 
periods are “far too short to ensure that violations of constitutional rights are redressed”); 
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where such impediments to relief grounded in finality already exist,428 a state taking the 
opportunity provided by Danforth to reconsider its approach to retroactivity should 
question whether finality has already been adequately served.  
 
The criticisms of Professor Bator and Judge Friendly, and the Supreme Court’s 
development of its retroactivity doctrine through Teague, all occurred at a time when 
there was no statute of limitations for the bringing of a federal habeas corpus petition.429  
Under such circumstances, Bator could complain that federal habeas review afforded the 
opportunity for “endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law,”430 while Judge Friendly 
viewed the idea of a statute of limitations on collateral attack as among the “most drastic” 
suggestions for reform.431 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital 
Postconviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital 
Counsel, 2003 Wisc. L. Rev. 31, 92-94 (2003) (noting burdens placed on postconviction 
counsel by state and federal statutes of limitation, and arguing for right to effective 
capital postconviction counsel in part for that reason); Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River 
Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in 
State Courts, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 655, 690-95 (2005) (advocating equitable “due diligence” 
approach, rather than statutes of limitation, with respect to postconviction claims based 
on newly discovered evidence); Holly Schaffter, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 
Pound Gorilla in State Courts, 50 Drake L. Rev. 695, 736 (2002) (urging abolition of 
time limits on DNA-based postconviction claims of newly discovered evidence of 
innocence). 
The most common criticism of default doctrines is that they punish prisoners based 
on the quality of their counsel. Sessions, supra, at 1562 n.268 (collecting criticisms of 
procedural default); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 
Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1234-36 (1986) (arguing that because “a procedural default 
frequently reflects, quite simply, a breakdown in the adversary process,” forfeiture rules 
should be modified to place costs of forfeiture on the prosecution in more instances); see 
also Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed 
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 82 (2002) 
(writing that the Supreme Court has permitted procedural default doctrines “to become so 
drastically uncompromising that they permit states to deprive state death row inmates of 
any meaningful post-conviction review”); id. at 78 (“Procedural default rules now roam 
the landscape like wild beasts, devouring claims without regard to the fact that the 
reasons for the default are often either trivial or, worse, completely beyond the inmate's 
control.”).  
428 Schaffter, supra note 427, at 710 (2002) (noting trend among states toward imposing 
statutes of limitation on postconviction proceedings). 
429 In 1996, as part of AEDPA, Congress imposed a one-year statute of limitations on 
federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 
430 Bator, supra note 25, at 452. 
431 Friendly, supra note 140, at 130 & n.34. 
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Many states have imposed statutes of limitation on postconviction actions.432  Such 
statutes serve to mitigate any costs to finality occasioned by retroactive application of 
new rules to cases on state postconviction review.433  Furthermore, through such statutes 
of limitation, states can take a nuanced approach to finality – for example, according 
finality in proportion to the severity of the offense,434 granting equitable tolling, or 
exempting claims based on new evidence435 or alleging actual innocence.436  Some states 
also afford litigants an exemption to statutes of limitation for claims based on new 
judicial decisions.437 Existing statutes of limitation thus provide a state-law mechanism 
for delineating finality concerns that do not implicate the non-uniformity concerns raised 
by the Danforth dissent with respect to a multiplicity of state retroactivity rules.438 
 
State-law procedural default rules also serve the finality interests raised by Bator and 
Friendly.439  As is noted above, most states prohibit claims from being raised in 
postconviction proceedings that “could or should” have been raised on direct review. 440  
This rule serves generally to ensure that postconviction proceedings are not a second 
round of litigation for the claims raised on direct review, but rather a first round of 
litigation for postconviction claims, and largely eliminates finality concerns in 
postconviction proceedings.441   
 
Like statutes of limitation, procedural default doctrines are arguably superior to 
nonretroactivity doctrines as mechanisms for serving finality concerns.442  Principal 
among the benefits of procedural default is that, whereas nonretroactivity requires 
selection of a “trigger point” which inevitably creates irrelevant distinctions between 
otherwise similarly situated litigants,443 procedural default is aimed at the conduct of the                                                         
432 E.g. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-5-402; Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545; 
725 Ill. Compiled Stat. Ann. Act 5 § 122-1. See supra note 428. 
433 Cf. Yin, supra note 18, at 306 (noting AEDPA’s statute of limitations severely reduces 
costs to finality of Yin’s proposed approach to retroactivity on federal habeas review). 
434 E.g. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-5-402(1) (longer limitations period for more serious 
offenses). Compare Louisiana Stat. Ann., Code of Crim. P. Art. 930.8(A)(1) (exempting 
capital cases from statute of limitations) with Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) and Fla. R. 
Crim. P. Rule 3.850 (b)(imposing shorter statute of limitations period in capital cases). 
435 E.g. Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42(10)(a); Iowa Code § 822.3.  
436 E.g. 725 Ill. Compiled Stat. Ann. Act 5 § 122-1(c). See also Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-
30-102(b)(2)(requiring claim of actual innocence to be based on “new scientific 
evidence”). 
437 E.g. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2). 
438 See supra notes 277-284, and accompanying text. 
439 See generally Yin, supra note 18 (arguing that procedural default doctrine serves all 
the functions of Teague retroactivity and should replace the retroactivity analysis in cases 
on federal habeas review). 
440 See supra notes 321-335, and accompanying text. 
441 See Section III-C, supra. 
442 Yin, supra note 18, at 256-91. 
443 See Section III-B, supra. 
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litigant or her lawyer, and therefore tends to draw more meaningful distinctions between 
litigants.444  Furthermore, procedural default doctrine lacks some of the problems 
attendant to administration of a nonretroactivity regime,445 a subject I address in the next 
section. 
 
The wisdom of such procedural limits is open to question,446 and I do not intend for this 
Article to advocate the adoption of these limits.  Yet, for purposes of deciding what 
retroactivity regime to adopt after Danforth, suffice it to say that the finality concerns 
thought to justify a nonretroactivity regime may already be amply protected by existing 
statutes of limitation and procedural default rules. 
 
G. Problems in administration avoided by the return to retroactivity 
 
The final reason I offer for abandoning nonretroactivity is simply the avoidance of the 
problems of administering a nonretroactivity regime, such as defining what constitutes a 
“new rule” and determining the purpose of a rule.  Lower courts would be well advised to 
avoid the new rule question, which I have already noted has confounded the Court.447  
 
Beyond the “new rule” question lurks more uncertainty.  The prospectivity rules used by 
the Supreme Court – from Linkletter-Stovall to Teague – have required the Court to 
examine the purpose of a new constitutional rule, an inquiry as suited to indeterminacy as 
the question of whether a rule is new.  Generally the “purpose” inquiry degenerates into a                                                         
444 Yin, supra note 18, at 288-91.  This is not to say that procedural default is free of 
problems.  Toby Heytens rightly points out that “[b]ecause they impose draconian 
consequences on criminal defendants, and because they do so based on lawyer inaction 
rather than client choice, forfeiture rules bear a heavy burden of justification.” Heytens, 
supra, note 223, at 942.  That defendants are blamed for their lawyers’ inaction due to 
state-law postconviction rules prohibiting claims that “could or should” have been raised 
on direct review is somewhat mitigated in that a lawyer’s deficient performance at trial, 
or on appeal as of a matter of right, might constitute cognizable grounds for excusing the 
procedural default.  That this might be true, however, does not address Professor 
Roosevelt’s criticism of forfeiture for not accommodating the “paradigm case of a new 
rule… -- where the Supreme Court overturns its prior precedent—‘timely’ trial 
presentation of the claim is frivolous (because the prior precedent foreclosed it), and 
penalizing litigants for failing to raise frivolous claims serves neither fairness nor 
efficiency.” Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18, at 1688.  Professor Dow summarizes the 
problem aptly: “[A]lthough the constitutional demand of the Sixth Amendment imposes 
an extremely low threshold, under new rule jurisprudence a defendant will be fairly 
treated only if his attorney is brilliant.” Dow, supra note 18, at 27-28 (citation omitted). 
445 See Yin, supra note 18, at 256-82 (discussing problems in defining what is a “new 
rule” for purposes of retroactivity analysis). 
446 See supra note 427. 
447 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 25.5 at 981-93. See supra notes 186-195 and 
accompanying text. 
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question of whether the “new rule” promotes accuracy.448  The question of whether a rule 
promotes accuracy is “intractable,”449 in part because of the epistemological divide 
between actual guilt or innocence and Bator’s “process” guilt or innocence, exemplified 
by the difference in the majority and dissenting opinions in Summerlin,450 and in part 
because society’s perception of the processes that are important to accuracy are subject to 
constant revision.451 
 
The inquiry into the purpose of a “new rule” is also, I submit, unnecessary.  A heightened 
contribution to the accuracy of verdicts is found, under Supreme Court doctrine, to 
counterbalance the finality concerns thought to justify nonretroactivity.  But, like the 
states’ interests in finality, the states’ interests in promoting accuracy are, or could be, 
adequately served through other procedural mechanisms.  Chief among the mechanisms 
that serve accuracy are harmless error doctrine452 and the prejudice component of the                                                         
448 In Linkletter, for example, the deciding factor was that the exclusionary rule has “no 
bearing on guilt.” Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636, 637-38.  Similarly, Teague’s “watershed” 
exception requires inquiry into whether the new rule bears on the accuracy of the 
conviction. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-14. 
449 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in 
part). 
450 See supra notes 355-359 and accompanying text.  This epistemological divide can also 
be seen in comparing accounts of Miranda’s exclusionary rule.  In her dissent in Withrow 
v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), Justice O’Connor lamented the fact that Miranda 
results in the suppression of trustworthy statements and thereby “impairs the pursuit of 
truth.” Id. at 703 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  This account looks to whether Miranda 
serves the pursuit of objective truth.  But in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), 
the Court adhered to a “process” view of reliability, describing Miranda as an effort “to 
free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, 
whether particular confessions were voluntary.” Id. at 433.  See also supra note 86 
(discussing competing views of interests served by Fifth Amendment privilege). 
451 See, e.g., Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: 
Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures, 41 Valparaiso L. Rev. 109 (2006) (demonstrating current rule 
of decision is out of step with intervening social science research); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 Golden Gate 
L. Rev. 107 (2006) (arguing for pre-trial hearings to examine reliability of jailhouse 
“snitch” testimony, based on recent evidence of wrongful convictions based on such 
testimony).  Our constantly evolving understanding of what factors contribute to 
wrongful convictions means a rule believed today to serve reliability may be found 
tomorrow to be unrelated to reliability tomorrow, or a rule believed today to serve only 
dignity or some other systemic interest may be found tomorrow to be correlated to 
reliability. 
452 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (even constitutional error may be held 
harmless if court can find it harmless “beyond a reasonable doubt”).  The federal courts 
have added a layer of harmless error for cases on federal habeas review. Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (citing comity and finality concerns, announcing that 
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constitutional rule to be applied.453 
 
Here again, I do not intend to advocate for the procedural mechanisms that are already in 
place.  Instead, with state courts faced with the opportunity to revise their retroactivity 
doctrines, I simply note that the interests thought to be served through nonretroactivity 
doctrines are already well served by existing rules and should not stand as an impediment 
to adopting retroactivity for cases in postconviction proceedings. 
  
IV. THE FUTURE OF RETROACTIVITY IN  
FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 
 
The Danforth majority, while explicitly leaving open the question of Teague’s 
applicability in federal postconviction proceedings,454 suggests that “[m]uch of the 
reasoning applicable to applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to § 2254 
seems equally applicable in the context of § 2255 motions.”455  Similarly, Justice Harlan 
in his Mackey opinion considered § 2255 proceedings “virtually congruent” to federal 
habeas review of state-court judgments.456   
 
Judge Friendly, by contrast, correctly associated federal postconviction proceedings not 
with federal habeas review but with state postconviction proceedings.  A desire to 
consider the “basic principle of collateral attack” required Judge Friendly to center his 
analysis “in the context of a unitary system,” and not with “the special problem of federal                                                                                                                                                                      
habeas relief will not be granted unless error had “substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining jury’s verdict”); see also Fry v. Pliler, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 
(2007) (holding that Brecht harmlessness standard will apply to all claims raised on 
federal habeas review, “whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and 
reviewed it for harmlesness” under Chapman).  At least one state court has done the 
same. Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 375 & n.11 (Tex. Cr. App. 1996) (applying 
heightened harmless-error standard in collateral proceedings). 
453 E.g. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (requiring defendant alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel to demonstrate not only that counsel’s performance was 
deficient, but also that “but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different”).  Other redundant protections of the accuracy 
interest are seen in rules delineating what claims may even be presented in collateral 
proceedings, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Fourth Amendment claims 
generally not cognizable on federal habeas review), and in procedural default rules, to the 
extent they embody a “cause and prejudice” exception which looks to the accuracy of the 
underlying judgment. E.g. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).  For a general 
discussion of how Friendly’s “innocence” argument has been incorporated into 
procedural and substantive law, see Guilt, supra note 161, at 604-09. 
454 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1034 n.4. 
455 Id. at 1041 n.16. 
456 401 U.S. at 681 & n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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relief for state prisoners.” 457  Beginning with an analysis of federal postconviction 
proceedings, Judge Friendly then advocated the same model for state postconviction 
proceedings.458 
 
Federal postconviction proceedings differ in function from federal habeas review in the 
same three important ways that state postconviction proceedings do: there are no comity 
concerns presented, they constitute a second round of litigation (not a third, as federal 
habeas review does), and they provide an initial forum to litigate claims particular to 
postconviction proceedings such as ineffective assistance of counsel and government 
suppression of material exculpatory evidence.459  In all relevant respects, then, federal 
postconviction proceedings are like state postconviction proceedings and unlike federal 
habeas review. 
 
One federal district court has recognized the critical differences between § 2255 
proceedings and § 2254 proceedings, and declined to apply Teague in federal 
postconviction actions.460  The court noted that “the section 2255 remedy for federal 
prisoners bears the markings of an integral part of a continuous criminal proceeding that 
is segmented by no event or condition decisive of finality.”461  The other lower courts to 
consider the question have all held Teague is binding in federal postconviction actions.462 
 
Unfortunately some lower federal courts have seized upon Justice Harlan’s 
announcement of principles pertaining to habeas review in Mackey, which arose in part 
from federal postconviction proceedings, as an indication that the Court’s Teague rule, 
based upon Justice Harlan’s reasoning in Mackey, applies in § 2255 proceedings.463  Yet, 
perpetuation of the illogic that federal postconviction is analogous to federal habeas 
review is but one of the reasons given by the lower courts for following Teague in § 2255                                                         
457 Friendly, supra note 140, at 146. 
458 Id. 
459 See supra notes 314-335, and accompanying text. 
460 United States v. Payne, 894 F.Supp. 534, 542-43 (D. Mass. 1995); Fisher v. United 
States, 931 F.Supp. 53, 57 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing Payne).  It is worth noting that Payne 
concerned a claim the district court held could not have been raised on direct review, and 
thus the postconviction action was essentially substituting for direct review. 894 F. Supp. 
at 541. Cf. Section III-C, supra (noting that postconviction proceedings serve the same 
function as direct review with respect to certain postconviction claims). 
461 Payne, 894 F.Supp. at 543 (quoting JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL 
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 22A.6, at 272-74 (Michie Supp.1993)). 
462 Sanabria v. United States, 916 F.Supp 106 (D. P.R. 1996); Gilberti v. United States, 
917 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Martinez, 139 F.3d 412, 416 (4th Cir. 
1998); Valentine v. United States, 488 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2007); Van Daalwyk v. United 
States, 21 F.3d 179, 183 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 
664 (9th Cir. 2002); Daniels v. United States, 254 F.3d 1180, 1194 (10th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Swindall, 107 F.3d 831 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ayala, 282 U.S. 
App. D.C. 266, 894 F.2d 425, 429 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
463 Gilberti, 917 F.2d at 94; Martinez, 139 F.3d at 416; Sanabria, 916 F.Supp at 110. 




Another reason commonly given by the lower federal courts for applying Teague in 
postconviction proceedings is the notion that “even in the absence of comity concerns, 
the need for finality is equally as great for federal convictions as for those issued by state 
courts.”464  While this statement may be true, it is true only to the extent that the 
comparison is between the finality interests measured at the time of state postconviction 
proceedings and those measured at the time of federal postconviction proceedings.  
Because federal postconviction proceedings are a second round of litigation – not a third 
round, as in federal habeas review of state-court judgments – the finality interests 
attaching in such proceedings are not as great as a state’s interest in finality at the time of 
federal habeas review.465  Accepting that the federal government has as strong a finality 
interest in federal postconviction proceedings as a state does in state postconviction 
proceedings, it does not follow that Teague applies to federal postconviction proceedings.  
I have demonstrated that state interests in finality are insufficient reason to adopting a 
Teague-like prospectivity regime in state postconviction actions.466  For the same 
reasons, the argument that federal finality interests compel adoption of Teague in federal 
postconviction actions must fail. 
 
Federal courts applying Teague in § 2255 proceedings also cited a concern for equality 
which is no longer applicable after Danforth.  It would be unfair, the argument went, for 
state prisoners, and not federal prisoners, to be subject to Teague: “Exempting federal 
prisoners from the Teague doctrine of retroactivity would result in the courts treating 
federal prisoners more favorably than state prisoners.”467   After Danforth, which frees 
states to afford more retroactivity to state prisoners in postconviction actions than Teague 
permits in federal habeas cases, this equality argument demands that federal 
postconviction courts enjoy a similar freedom to extend retroactivity to federal prisoners.  
This is especially so given the functional equivalence between federal and state 
postconviction actions.  
                                                         
464 Sanabria, 916 F.Supp at 111; see also, e.g., Gilberti, 917 F.2d at 94 (Teague’s 
“primary reason for restricting collateral review . . . the goal of finality . . . is common to 
both federal and state applications”); Van Daalwyk, 21 F.3d at 182 (“strong finality 
values attach to federal convictions when avenues of direct review are closed”); Sanchez-
Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 667 (“The rule against retroactive application of new laws 
supports important interests of finality that pertain to both the federal system and the state 
system.”). 
465 See supra notes 401-402, and accompanying text. 
466 See Section III-F, supra. 
467 Elortegui, supra, 743 F. Supp. at 831; see also Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 667 
(noting inequity of “deny[ing] use of a new rule to state prisoners but allow[ing] such use 
to federal prisoners”); Martinez, 139 F.3d at 416 (“It would be wrong to create an 
anomaly whereby new rules would apply retroactively to those in federal custody but not 
to state prisoners.”); Gilberti, supra, 917 F.2d at 95 (“Injecting a federal/state dichotomy 
into the picture would defeat rather than further [Teague’s] goal of consistency”). 
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Broadly speaking, because the federal postconviction track is identical to the state 
postconviction track in all relevant respects, the reasons for favoring retroactive 
application of new rules in federal postconviction proceedings are the same as those for 
favoring retroactivity in state postconviction proceedings.468  I would submit, however, 
that the case for retroactivity in federal postconviction proceedings has an added urgency.  
First, federal courts have a greater interest in preserving the uniformity of federal law – 
unlike state courts (which, I have demonstrated above, also share a commitment to the 
uniformity of federal law469), federal courts have no local law to develop as an alternative 
to federal law. 
 
Second, following the same reasoning, federal courts have a greater interest in developing 
federal law than do the state courts. As is amply documented here and elsewhere, the 
lower federal courts have already been severely restricted in their ability to contribute to 
the development of constitutional criminal doctrine, by the one-two punch of Teague and 
AEDPA.470  The inability of federal courts to use federal habeas review of state court 
judgments as a vehicle for developing doctrine dramatically reduces their opportunity for 
participation, both with respect to direct review claims and postconviction claims.  Lower 
federal courts can use federal criminal cases on the direct review track for doctrinal 
development, but the number of cases tried471 is miniscule compared to the number of 
federal habeas corpus petitions considered.472  The number of federal postconviction 
actions handled each year,473 while much smaller than the number of habeas petitions, is 
still larger than the number of trials.  Preserving federal postconviction proceedings as a 
locus for doctrinal development is critical, and it is the only way for the lower federal 
courts to participate in developing doctrine with respect to postconviction claims like 
ineffective assistance of counsel and government suppression of material exculpatory 
evidence.  Because state courts will be free to engage in such doctrinal development after 
Danforth, it makes little sense for federal courts to refrain from doing the same. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF RETROACTIVITY IN 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE-COURT 
JUDGMENTS 
                                                         
468 See Section III, supra. 
469 See Section III-E, supra. 
470 See supra notes 221-236; see generally, Shay & Lasch, supra note 17. 
471 While guilty plea cases will afford some opportunity for doctrinal development, even 
on direct review, the range of issues that present through guilty pleas is narrower than at 
trial. 
472 Compare ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS 2003, tbl.D-4 (2004) (available online at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/contents.html) (3,463 criminal trials in 12-month 
period ending Sept. 30, 2003) with id., tbl.C-2 (23,070 federal habeas petitions in same 
period). 
473 Id., tbl.C-2 (5,832 federal postconviction proceedings initiated in 12-month period 
ending Sept. 30, 2003). 
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The main purpose of this Article – to explore the possibilities Danforth creates for the 
lower state and federal courts to dispense with retroactivity analysis and participate in 
doctrinal development across the entire field of constitutional criminal procedure – has 
now been served.  But, before closing, it is worth noting that Danforth marks a possible 
transition point for federal habeas review as well. 
 
First – and this may well be wishful thinking – it may be that the long-term vitality of 
Teague is in doubt.  There are some interesting currents flowing beneath the surface 
waters of the Danforth opinion, which may portend poorly for Teague’s longevity.  The 
Court’s emphatic return to the Blackstonian “declaratory” model of judging is one; the 
similarly wholehearted embrace of the law of remedies as a vehicle for deciding 
questions of retroactivity is another.   
 
Both of these currents work to undermine the foundations of Teague.  In tandem they 
erode Justice Harlan’s view of federal habeas corpus as serving a “deterrence function” 
whereby the “threat” of being overturned on habeas review would force state courts to 
“toe the constitutional line.”474 This view was the principal reason Justice Harlan 
believed a habeas court “need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the 
time the original proceedings took place.” 475 
 
The return to Blackstone is inconsistent with this view, at least on a theoretical level.   
Under a Blackstonian view, announcement of a “new” constitutional rule does not, in 
fact, “imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of 
trial.”476  To the contrary, the Blackstonian view implies that a state court that did not 
reach the same result as would be reached under a “new rule” simply got it wrong. 
Combining this theory with the view that habeas relief is a punishment to state courts for 
their failure to “toe the constitutional line” would require retroactive application of new 
rules.  It was the departure from Blackstone that permitted Justice Harlan to embrace the 
“deterrence” view of habeas and yet insist that “new rules” need not be applied. Under 
the Austinian model, “new rules” are truly new – and therefore trial courts cannot be 
faulted for having applied “old” law, which was in fact correct at the time of trial.  It 
would make no sense to punish state courts by awarding habeas relief in such 
circumstances. 
 
As a consequence, although references to the “threat” of habeas and the need to make 
state courts “toe the constitutional line” feature prominently in Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion in Teague,477 the “deterrence” function of habeas disappears entirely in 
Danforth.  In its stead the Court shifts to a remedial analysis.  
 
The abandoning of the “deterrence function” of federal habeas review should logically 
result in a repudiation of the conclusion Justice Harlan drew from that function – that a                                                         
474 Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
475 Id. at 263. 
476 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1047. 
477 489 U.S. at 306-07. 
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habeas court “need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the 
original proceedings took place.”478  Additionally, it opens up the field for a 
reinvigoration of the view of state and federal courts as engaged in a constitutional 
dialogue, “speak[ing] and listen[ing] as equals,” 479 and each treating the other with 
“mutual respect and awareness.”480  This dialogue is much more likely to occur if the 
lower courts embrace retroactivity in intra-system postconviction proceedings, as I have 
urged here. 
 
Make no mistake, the Court does not appear to be ready to give up on the retroactivity 
experiment, as full adherence to the Blackstonian model would require.  Nor does the 
Court appear inclined to adopt the selective prospectivity urged by those commentators 
who have most forcefully advocated for the current mode of thinking adopted by the 
Court – the use of the law of remedies, rather than retroactivity, to limit the availability of 
federal habeas relief.481 
 
It is significant that Justice Stevens described the period of “somewhat confused and 
confusing ‘retroactivity’ cases” as “the years between 1965 and 1987.”  Teague, of 
course, was decided in 1989.  There is no repudiation of Teague on the horizon in 
Danforth – indeed, I have pointed to Justice Steven’s revisionist history in bringing 
Teague into the fold of the Court’s current Blackstonian, remedy-centered retroactivity 
jurisprudence.  If it is ultimately to come, however, the theoretical dissonance between 
the logic underlying Teague and that underlying Danforth may well be a contribution to 
Teague’s timely demise. 
 
A more modest, yet important change in the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence may be 
that the lower federal courts are empowered to abandon the requirement that Teague 
retroactivity be considered a threshold question, as a consequence of Danforth’s 
conversion to the Blackstonian “declaratory” model.  Under the Austinian model 
employed in Teague,482 the proposed “new” rule would only come into existence if 
announced by the Court.  It thus made no sense to explicate the contours of a proposed 
                                                        
478 Id. at 263. 
479 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 226, at 1036.  
480 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 226 at 1048.  See supra note 227. 
481 See generally, Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 18; Roosevelt (2007), supra note 18. 
482 That Justice O’Connor ascribed to the Austinian model is fully evident in her opinion 
in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991). “I reiterate … that 
precisely because this Court has “the power ‘to say what the law is,’” when the Court 
changes its mind, the law changes with it. If the Court decides, in the context of a civil 
case or controversy, to change the law, it must make the subsequent determination 
whether the new law or the old is to apply to conduct occurring before the law-changing 
decision.” Id. at 550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Id. at 2451) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 
(1803)). 
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constitutional rule that “would not be applicable”483 to the case at hand even if held to 
exist; such a declaration would be mere dicta – an advisory opinion.484   
 
On the Blackstonian model, however, the “new” rule’s existence or non-existence is 
declared – not created – and is deemed always to have been thus.  The rule, if it exists, 
“applies” to every case, and the only question is whether the federal habeas remedy will 
be given or withheld.  As Justice Stevens has noted, the ordinary method of judging is 
first to determine whether there has been a constitutional violation and then determine 
what remedy, if any, will be given.485  There is a strong argument that, especially under 
the Blackstonian model, a reversed “order of battle” for Teague questions results in 
unnecessary advisory opinions.486  The Teague analysis requires a federal habeas court to 
determine whether the proposed “new” constitutional rule meets one of the two Teague 
exceptions to nonretroactivity – which involves “carefully examining the underlying 
federal right”487 – to determine whether the “new” rule “would be applied retroactively to 
the defendant in the case and to all others similarly situated.”488  It makes no sense – in a 
Blackstonian world – for a habeas court to engage in an investigation of a proposed new 
rule’s connection to accuracy and the fundamental fairness of a criminal trial489 before 
deciding whether the rule exists.  If the rule does not exist, the question of remedy is 
irrelevant and advisory; if the rule does exist, but does not warrant the federal habeas 
remedy, there seems little point in a court’s engaging in falsely hypothetical discussion, 
when the court could as easily issue binding precedent.   A holding that the proposed 
constitutional rule exists, of course, would serve one of the functions of federal habeas 
corpus – to promote state courts’ adherence to federal constitutional law – even if not in 
the case at bar, in future cases. 490 
 
Lower federal courts undertaking the Teague inquiry after Danforth would be justified, in 
light of Danforth’s explicit adoption of the declaratory model of judging, in undertaking 
the Teague inquiry in the order suggested by Justice Stevens – first, to consider whether 
the constitutional rule at issue exists, and then to consider whether the habeas remedy is 
available for the rule’s violation.  This can fairly be described as a major advance, and                                                         
483 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (“[T]he rule petitioner urges would not be applicable to this 
case, which is on collateral review, unless it would fall within an exception.”). 
484 Id. at 316 (refusal to announce “new” constitutional rule in case to which rule would 
be inapplicable “eliminate[s] any problems of rendering advisory opinions ….”). 
485 Teague, 489 U.S. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
486 Commentators have written that the Teague threshold test violates the prohibition on 
advisory opinions. Hertz & Liebman, supra note 18, § 25.4 at 964-67; Blume, supra note 
18, at 583. 
487 Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1054 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
488 Teague, 489 U.S. at 316. 
489 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 312. 
490 Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (federal habeas serves “deterrent” 
function by judging state-court judgments according to “constitutional standards that 
prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place. “). 
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The Danforth decision affords great hope for a redistribution of interpretive power from 
the Supreme Court to the lower state and federal courts.  Unbound by Teague, there is no 
impediment to those courts affording full retroactivity in postconviction proceedings to 
“new rules” of federal constitutional doctrine.  This result serves the goals of according 
fairness to similarly situated litigants, allowing lower courts to participate in doctrinal 
development, and promoting uniform development of federal constitutional law.  
Danforth also holds promise for a reworking of the Court’s retroactivity doctrine in 
federal habeas review of state-court judgments.  The premises of Danforth are 
inconsistent with the underpinnings of Teague, and leave a dissonance in the Court’s 
jurisprudence that calls for resolution.  Finally, abandonment of retroactivity analysis as a 
threshold inquiry, as the logic of Danforth permits, will allow the lower federal courts to 
resume the business of doctrinal development in federal habeas cases. 
                                                        
491 Of course, the most significant impediment to lower courts’ participation in doctrinal 
development is AEDPA, as Giovanna Shay and I have explained. Shay & Lasch, supra 
note 17.  Congressional revision of AEDPA’s “clearly established law” provision could 
help augment of the role of the lower federal courts., but eliminating the Teague 
preference for avoiding determinations of the existence or non-existence of “new” 
constitutional rules, however, will also be required, because Teague’s impediment to 
doctrinal development applies even when AEPDA’s restrictions do not. See Kater v. 
Maloney, 459 F.3d 56, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying Teague where AEDPA did not 
apply because constitutional claim not decided by state courts “on the merits”).  
